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EXPLAINING THE SUPREME COURT’S SHRINKING
DOCKET
RYAN J. OWENS* & DAVID A. SIMON**
ABSTRACT
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has decided
fewer cases than at any other time in its recent history. Scholars and
practitioners alike have criticized the drop in the Court’s plenary
docket. Some even believe that the Court has reneged on its duty to
clarify and unify the law. A host of studies examine potential reasons
for the Court’s change in docket size, but few rely on an empirical
analysis of this change and no study examines the correlation
between ideological homogeneity and docket size. 
In a comprehensive study, the authors analyze ideological and
contextual factors to determine the conditions that are most likely to
influence the size of the plenary docket. Drawing on empirical data
from every Supreme Court Term between 1940 and 2008, the authors
find that both ideological and contextual factors have led to the
Court’s declining plenary docket. First, a Court composed of Justices
who share largely the same world view is likely to hear forty-two
more cases per Term than an ideologically fractured Court. Second,
internal and external mechanisms, such as membership change and
mandatory jurisdiction, are also important. Congress’s decision to
remove much of the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction is
associated with the Court deciding roughly fifty-four fewer cases per
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Term. In short, the data suggest that ideology and context have led
to a Supreme Court that decides fewer cases.
The Court’s docket is not likely to increase significantly in the near
future. Unless Congress expands the Court’s mandatory appellate
jurisdiction or the President makes a series of unconstrained nomi-
nations to the Court that increase its ideological homogeneity, the
size of the Court’s docket will remain relatively small compared to
the past. Because the Court’s case selection process is an important
aspect of the development of the law, this Article provides the basis
for further normative and empirical evaluations of the Court’s ple-
nary docket.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 9, 2010, Justice John Paul Stevens set off fireworks in
Washington, D.C. when he informed the White House that he
planned to retire during the Court’s summer recess. Immediately,
scholars and journalists predicted who might succeed him, as well
as the political and legal ramifications of the selection. Attention
quickly turned to a handful of individuals: Judge Diane P. Wood of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Judge
Merrick B. Garland of the United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit, Judge Sidney R. Thomas of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Solicitor General Elena Kagan,
Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, and
former Georgia Supreme Court Justice Leah Ward Sears.1 Each of
these potential nominees came to the table with a set of unique
advantages and disadvantages, to be sure. Commentators, unsur-
prisingly, debated a series of questions: Would the President nom-
inate from the left? Would he nominate a centrist candidate? Would
Senate Republicans filibuster the nominee? Indeed, one news outlet
expected to see a “bruising ... confirmation battle” after Senate
Republicans signaled they would filibuster any nominee who was
“clearly outside the mainstream.”2
It is not hard to understand why attention was focused so closely
on nominee ideology and Senate filibusters. After all, Presidents
spend political capital on Supreme Court nominations primarily for
ideological reasons.3 Senators, of course, largely have the same
1. Jake Tapper, Leah Ward Sears, African-American Woman, on Obama’s Short List for
High Court, ABC NEWS (Apr. 12, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Supreme_Court/
president-obama-review-nominees-supreme-court/story?id=10347285.
2. Senators Signal Bruising Confirmation Battle on Supreme Court Nominee, CNN:
POLITICS (Apr. 11, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-04-11/politics/supreme.court.senate_1_
supreme-court-filibuster-activist-court?_s=PM:POLITICS.
3. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 49-56 (2005); CHRISTINE L. NEMACHECK, STRATEGIC SELECTION:
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES FROM HERBERT HOOVER THROUGH
GEORGE W. BUSH 19-21 (2007); Garland W. Allison, Delay in Senate Confirmation of Federal
Judicial Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 8, 10-11 (1996); Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, The
Limits of Senatorial Courtesy, 29 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5, 14-15 (2004); Sarah A. Binder & Forrest
Maltzman, Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947-1998, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI.
190, 191 (2002); Charles M. Cameron, Albert D. Cover & Jeffrey A. Segal, Senate Voting on
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motivations, and sometimes even employ the filibuster for purely
political or ideological reasons.4 Indeed, during the confirmation of
Justice Samuel Alito, Republicans had to invoke cloture to over-
come a Democrat filibuster. In short, coming as it did during an
election year, on the heels of the highly controversial health care
showdown, and during a time when the two major parties were
more polarized than ever,5 the nomination seemed tailor made for
a political battle.
Although the Stevens departure and elevation of Justice Kagan
to the Court has come and gone, questions remain—questions that
went ignored in the extensive discussion of the nomination. Would
the new nominee to the Court spur it to hear more cases? What
factors led the Court to hear historically low numbers of cases in
recent Terms? And, are there ways to increase the number of cases
the Court hears on an annual basis?
The answers to these questions are important for a host of rea-
sons, not least of which is that the Supreme Court’s impact on the
law is a function of the type and number of cases it hears. When the
Court fails to grant certiorari in cases that call for review, it leaves
the law unclear.6 And, by that standard, legal ambiguity may be
Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 528 (1990); Lee
Epstein, René Lindstädt, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Changing Dynamics of
Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees, 68 J. POL. 296, 302-03 (2006); Glen S. Krutz,
Richard Fleisher & Jon R. Bond, From Abe Fortas to Zoë Baird: Why Some Presidential
Nominations Fail in the Senate, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 871, 873-74 (1998); Bryon J. Moraski
& Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional
Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069, 1092 (1999); Jeffrey Segal, Senate
Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices: Partisan and Institutional Politics, 49 J. POL. 998,
999-1000 (1987).
4. See generally SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE?:
FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE 13-18 (1997); Sarah A. Binder, Anthony J.
Madonna & Steven S. Smith, Going Nuclear, Senate Style, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 729, 729 (2007);
Timothy R. Johnson & Jason M. Roberts, Pivotal Politics, Presidential Capital, and Supreme
Court Nominations, 32 CONGRESS & THE PRESIDENCY 31, 31-32 (2005); Anthony J. Madonna,
Winning Coalition Formation in the U.S. Senate: The Effects of Legislative Decision Rules and
Agenda Change, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 276, 276-77 (2011).
5. See NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA:
THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 1-3 (2006).
6. See Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of
William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1366 (2006).
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rampant. The Court decides fewer cases per Term now than at any
other time in its modern history.7 
We examine factors that explain the Court’s diminished docket
with the hope of determining whether the trend can be reversed.
Although existing studies advocate compelling and reasonable
theories to explain the Court’s shrinking docket,8 such commentary
overlooks one potentially important feature: ideological hetero-
geneity on the Supreme Court. Ideology, after all, drives much of
Supreme Court decision making. It motivates whether the Justices
grant review in cases,9 to whom the Chief Justice assigns opinions,10
whether the Justices bargain and negotiate over the content of
opinions,11 Justices’ decisions to join final opinion coalitions,12 and
the Court’s review of lower court decisions.13
Our theory is that ideology, along with internal and external
factors, influences the number of cases the Supreme Court decides
each Term. That is, we hypothesize that the Court will decide more
cases per Term when it is composed of ideologically homogeneous
Justices but fewer cases when the Court is ideologically heteroge-
neous. This explanation for the changing size of the Court’s docket,
as well as alternative hypotheses of docket change, will be tested
empirically in this Article. 
7. See infra Part I.B (describing the Court’s shrinking docket).
8. See infra Part I.C (discussing explanations given for the Court’s shrinking docket).
9. See, e.g., Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The
Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence, 71 J. POL. 1062, 1062-64 (2009); Gregory A. Caldeira,
John R. Wright & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the
Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 549-50, 553-55 (1999).
10. See FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON
THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 29-56 (2000).
11. See James F. Spriggs II, Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Bargaining on the
U.S. Supreme Court: Justices’ Responses to Majority Opinion Drafts, 61 J. POL. 485, 485-86
(1999); Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II & Forrest Maltzman, Marshalling the Court:
Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294,
294-95 (1998).
12. See generally MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 10, at 125-48.
13. See Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Consider the Source (and the Message): Supreme
Court Justices and Strategic Audits of Lower Court Decisions, 64 POL. RES. Q. (forthcoming
2012) (manuscript at 1), available at http://prq.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/01/04/
1065912910395324; Charles M. Cameron, Jeffey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic
Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari
Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 101-03 (2000).
2012] SUPREME COURT’S SHRINKING DOCKET 1225
So, what can we expect from the Supreme Court in the near
future? If our data have anything to say on the matter, the answer
is a small docket in line with today’s size.
Part I introduces the discussion over the Court’s docket size. We
examine how the Court sets its agenda as well as the descriptive
data on the Court’s trend over modern times to hear fewer cases. We
then summarize existing theories of docket change. Part II high-
lights the normative concerns over the Court’s depleted docket, sug-
gesting that its failure to hear cases unnecessarily leads to confused
law, a Court that may be out of touch with pressing legal issues,
certain parties wielding disproportionate influence over legal
outcomes, and a diminution of the Court’s institutional legitimacy.
Part III introduces our theory for how ideology matters in the
selection of cases and why ideological disagreement on the Court
leads to a smaller docket. Part IV discusses our explanatory model.
Part V presents the results of the multivariate model. This Article
concludes by summarizing our findings and their larger significance.
It argues, in part, that unless the political landscape becomes less
polarized and results in a less ideologically diverse group of Justices
—which is not likely to happen anytime soon—we can expect the
Court to continue to decide relatively few cases each year. In short,
without a fundamental restructuring of the political landscape, the
legal landscape for the Court, at least in terms of its docket size, is
not likely to change significantly.
I. THE COURT’S DEPLETED DOCKET
Today’s Supreme Court decides markedly fewer cases than its
predecessors. Since the 2005 Term, the Court has decided an aver-
age of 80 cases per Term, far fewer than the roughly 200 cases it
heard earlier in the twentieth century. Justice Douglas captured
this dynamic presciently when he remarked nearly forty years ago:
“I think the Court [today] is overstaffed and underworked.... We
were much, much busier 25 or 30 years ago than we are today. I
really think that today the job does not add up to more than about
1226 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1219
four days a week.”14 In short, we are witnessing the “great disap-
pearing merits docket.”15
What led to this change and how can we correct it? Attempts to
answer these questions have generated many theories. We, of
course, have our own. We will get to them in time. First, however,
we discuss how the Court establishes its docket. Only by under-
standing how the Court sets its agenda can we then understand the
theories that account for the change in its docket size. As such, this
Part begins by explaining how the Court sets its agenda. We then
provide descriptive data that highlight just how historically re-
markable the Court’s depleted docket is. Afterwards, we summarize
existing explanations for this decline.
A. How the Court Chooses to Review Cases
By far, the vast majority of cases the Court hears and decides
each Term, at least these days, are cases it elects to hear via the cer-
tiorari process. The Court’s process for selecting cases begins when
a party in a lower court loses its case and petitions the Supreme
Court to review the offending decision. The petitioner who loses his
lower court decision will file a petition for certiorari with the clerk
of the Supreme Court. Once the petition, or jurisdictional statement
in the case of an appeal, is filed, the petition is randomly assigned
to one of the law clerks in the cert pool.16
The cert pool originated in 1972 to reduce the amount of cert
petition work done in each Justice’s individual chambers.17 Justice
Powell—and others—observed that forcing each Justice’s clerks to
review all cert petitions was inefficient and a poor use of their time
—time which could be better spent drafting opinions and bench
memos. Accordingly, he and a number of his colleagues pooled
14. ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW
CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 119 (2006) (quoting letter from William O.
Douglas to Warren E. Burger (July 13, 1972)).
15. Starr, supra note 6, at 1366.
16. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 14, at 125.
17. Prior to its creation, each chamber independently reviewed every petition for cert. Id.
at 117-18.
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together their clerks to make the number of petitions more manage-
able.18
The cert pool clerk randomly assigned to the case reads the
petition and all relevant materials included with it—such as a
response or amicus briefs—and writes a preliminary memo that
summarizes the proceedings and legal claims.19 The clerk concludes
with a recommendation for how the Court should treat the
petition.20 The pool memo is then distributed to the chambers of the
participating Justices.21 Relying on the memo and other informa-
tion, the Chief Justice circulates a list of the petitions he thinks
deserve consideration by the Court at its next conference. This
master list is called the “discuss list.”22 The Court summarily—
without a vote—denies petitions that do not make the discuss list.
At conference, the Justice who placed the case on the list—
typically the Chief—leads off discussion of the petition. That Justice
then casts an agenda vote—that is, to grant, deny, hold, or call for
the views of the Solicitor General. In order of seniority, the remain-
ing Justices do the same. If four or more Justices vote to grant
review, the case proceeds to the merits stage.23 This informal Court
rule, which requires at least four Justices to put a case on the
18. Id. at 118. When the Court initially created the pool, five Justices joined it: Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and Blackmun. Id. at 119. Justices
Douglas, Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall elected not to participate. Id. From that point on,
until Justice Alito opted out of the pool in September 2008, every Justice but Justice Stevens
joined the pool when they joined the Court. Id. at 125. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan have
joined the pool. See Tony Mauro, Kagan and Sotomayor Dive into the Cert Pool, NAT’L L.J.
(July 27, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202508559050.
19. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 14, at 125.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 126. Associate Justices may add petitions to the discuss list that they think
merit the Court’s attention, but no one may remove a petition from the list that a colleague
added. It is worth pointing out that prior to 1935, the Court discussed all petitions for review
and voted on them. Id. at 111. In 1935, Chief Justice Hughes created the “dead list,” also
called the “special list.” Id. at 113. If the Chief believed a case was patently frivolous, the
Chief would put the case on the dead list and, assuming no Justice wanted it taken off and
discussed, the case would be denied summarily. Id. As the number of petitions filed increased,
the Court switched gears and created the discuss list. Id. at 115. Cases that failed to make
the discuss list were automatically denied review without a vote. It is interesting to note the
Court’s default position with each method. Under the dead-list approach, all petitions are
presumed meritorious. Under the discuss-list approach, all petitions are presumed not to be
worthy of cert unless otherwise directed. See id. at 112-16.
23. Id. at 126.
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merits docket, is called the “Rule of Four.”24 There are no formal
requirements that direct Justices to grant certiorari review. The
decision is entirely discretionary to the Court. Supreme Court Rule
10 states simply that the Court is likely to hear cases that involve
conflicts among the lower courts, or cases that involve important
legal issues.25 All this is to say, then, that the agenda-setting
process the Court employs is rife with discretion, allowing Justices
to hear more, or fewer, cases as they wish.
B. A Descriptive View of the Court’s Depleted Docket
Indeed, Justices have wished to hear fewer cases. As Figure 1
shows, the contemporary Court decides fewer cases than any
Supreme Court in modern times. Figure 1 shows the number of
cases decided per Term, from the 1940 Term through the 2008
Term. It shows, unmistakably, that the Court’s docket is shrinking.
During the 1940s, the Court decided roughly 177 cases per Term.
During the 1950s, that number dropped to approximately 124 per
Term. In the 1960s, the number rose to about 137 per Term, and
by the middle of the 1980s, the Court heard slightly more cases.
Starting in the late 1980s and moving forward into the 1990s,
however, that number dropped precipitously. By the 2000 Term, the
Court heard only 87 cases.
24. As David O’Brien and others have shown, the Court will grant review to a petition
upon at least three grant votes plus one or more “Join-3” votes. See, e.g., David M. O’Brien,
The Rehnquist Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 81 JUDICATURE 58, 60-63 (1997). A Join-3
vote is like a conditional grant vote; if at least three other Justices vote to grant review to the
case, the Join-3 vote is the equivalent of a grant vote. If fewer than three other Justices vote
to grant review, the Join-3 is treated as a denial. Id. This informal Court procedure is known
as the “Rule of Three.”
25. SUP. CT. R. 10. Although there are strong norms compelling Justices to grant review
to cases with these legal factors present, Justices need not always follow them. Indeed, legal
conflict, although important, is not dispositive. H.W. Perry, for example, highlights a number
of Justices who believe that conflict among the circuits is sometimes tolerable and can lead
to a hashing out of views, making later Supreme Court review more efficient. H.W. PERRY,
JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 246-52
(1991).
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A closer inspection of the data reveals that, in addition to this
remarkable overall docket decrease, the Court has decided fewer
cases in many of the specific issue areas it decides. Consider Figure
2, which lays out the number of cases heard per Term by issue
area.27 Examine the most obvious reduction: the number of eco-
nomics cases decided per Term. During the 1946 Term, the Court
26. Figure 1 includes formally decided full opinion cases, unsigned orally argued cases,
and judgments of the Court. The data for 1953-2008 were collected from the 2010 Release 02
dataset of the United States Supreme Court Database. See UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
DATABASE, http://sedb.wustl.edu (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). For 1946-1952, the data were
collected from the Vinson-Warren Court Database. See VINSON-WARREN COURT DATABASE,
http://www.cas.sc.edulpoli/jurilsct.htm (last visited Feb 26, 2012). The data for 1940-1945
were collected from Tables 2 through 8 in the Supreme Court Compendium, and include the
number of cases per Term disposed of by signed opinion and per curiam opinion after oral
argument. See LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH, & THOMAS G. WALKER,
THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM (3d ed. 2003). The smoothed line depicted in Figure 1 is
a lowess smoother used to show general trends.
27. We derived these issue areas from the Supreme Court Database. See UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT DATABASE, supra note 26.
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decided 63 economics cases. During the 2008 Term, however, it
decided 17, a 73 percent reduction. Indeed, in the 1999 Term, the
Court heard only 11 economics cases. In terms of the Court’s overall
docket, this shift is seismic. 
Of course, economics cases are not the only type of cases the
Court now shuns. Tax cases and union cases also fell short of the
Court’s attention over time. In 1946, the Court decided 16 tax cases.
In the 2008 Term, it decided none. A similar pattern emerges when
one looks at union cases. In 1946, the Court decided 20 cases
dealing with labor unions. By the 2008 Term, however, that number
dropped to a meager one case. The drop in these cases is consis-
tently negative and nearly linear.
Other issues, although observing a slight uptick in the 1960s and
1970s, also failed to hold the Court’s attention during the 1980s and
1990s. Take, for example, the Court’s criminal procedure, civil
liberties, and First Amendment cases. During the 1940s, the Court
decided roughly 20 criminal procedure cases per Term. Like the
Court’s overall docket, the number of criminal procedure decisions
during the 1960s and 1970s increased slightly, but then dropped
thereafter. In the late 1940s, the Court averaged 10 decisions per
Term in civil liberties disputes. During the Warren and Burger
Courts, this number increased to an average of roughly 30 cases
per Term. Yet, like the criminal procedure cases and the Court’s
overall docket, the number of civil liberties decisions during the
Rehnquist and early Roberts Courts decreased such that the current
Court hears roughly 10 to 15 civil liberties claims per year. First
Amendment decisions reflect a similar trend. 
20121 SUPREME COURT'S SHRINKING DOCKET 1231
Figure 2: Number of Court Decisions by Issue Area, 1946-2008
Terms28
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Although the raw number of all decided cases decreased, some
issue areas fell out of the Court's favor more than others. Figure 3
28. Figure 2 displays the number of cases decided by the Court per Term and per issue
from 1946 to 2008. See supra note 26 for an explanation of how the data were collected. The
category entitled "Miscellaneous" was omitted from Figure 2.
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shows that, as a percentage of the Court’s overall docket, economics
cases clearly dropped off while criminal procedure and civil liberties
cases took on a larger role. During the early years of our sample,
roughly 35 percent of the Court’s docket consisted of economics
cases. Over time, that percentage decreased to roughly 20 percent.
In the 1981 Term, just under 10 percent of the Court’s docket con-
sisted of economics cases. Despite a slight uptick in recent years, the
percentage of cases dealing with economics is a shadow of what it
once was. Gone are the days when the Court rendered frequent
decisions regarding business and regulation. And, unless recent
economic and health care legislation passed by Congress makes an
extensive and consistent mark on the Court’s docket, we can safely
say that today’s Court, at least for the time being, is more interested
in other issues.
Instead, the Court has shifted its focus to criminal procedure and
civil liberties cases. In 1966, when the Court decided Miranda v.
Arizona,29 criminal procedure cases represented 17 percent of the
Court’s docket. When the Court affirmed Miranda in Dickerson v.
United States,30 criminal procedure cases represented 35 percent of
the Court’s docket. The Court’s attention also has turned to civil
liberties disputes. When the Court decided that Herman Sweatt
must be admitted to the School of Law of the University of Texas in
Sweatt v. Painter,31 just under 10 percent of the Court’s docket
consisted of civil liberties cases. Fifty-three years later, when the
Court decided Grutter v. Bollinger,32 19 percent of its cases involved
civil liberties. By the 2008 Term, that number reached 26 percent.
Clearly, the current Court is one that appears least interested in
business and economic cases and feels most at home setting law on
criminal and civil liberties matters. We cannot be sure just what to
make of this. But what is certain is that the Court’s attention to
some issues has wavered more than others and, overall, the modern
Court has changed dramatically the number and types of cases it
hears.
29. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
31. 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950).
32. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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Figure 3: Percent of Cases on the Docket by Issue Area, 1946-2008
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33. Figure 3 displays the percentage of cases decided by Court per Term and per issue
from 1946 to 2008. See supra note 26 for an explanation of how the data were collected.
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But why has the Court decided fewer cases? What features led the
Court to muzzle the number of decisions it produced? On this score
there are a host of explanations. We summarize them below.
C. Existing Explanations for the Court’s Depleted Docket
The question of why the Court hears fewer and fewer cases has
produced no shortage of explanations. Generally, these explanations
fall into one of three categories: (1) internal mechanisms and Court
composition, (2) external mechanisms, and (3) the judicial hierarchy.
1. Internal Mechanisms and Court Composition
To begin with, features internal to the Court may influence how
many cases the Court hears. By internal factors, we mean those
over which Justices largely have direct control. Like many institu-
tions, the Supreme Court observes a set of rules that govern its
practices and procedures, and which might influence the Court’s
docket size.34 At the same time, who sits on the Court can influence
the agenda it sets. These two factors—internal procedural mechan-
isms and Court composition—may influence the size of its plenary
docket. 
The Court’s informal rules and norms may have led to its de-
pleted docket. Its informal rules govern such things as the norm
against issue creation,35 the norm of seniority,36 and, most impor-
tantly for purposes of this paper, the conditions under which the
Court is most likely to grant a writ of certiorari to a petition for
34. See generally RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (2010), available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ctrules/2010RulesoftheCourt.pdf. It should be noted that,
although these rules are categorized as “internal mechanisms,” they regulate “external
mechanisms.” Rule 10, for example, is an internal mechanism because it states the conditions
under which the Court is likely to grant review. SUP. CT. R. 10. But whether those conditions
are present—whether, for example, a circuit split occurs—is an external mechanism over
which the Court cannot exercise control.
35. See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Timothy Johnson, The Claim of Issue Creation on
the U.S. Supreme Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 845, 845 (1996). Others have shown more
generally that law clerks can influence Supreme Court behavior. See, e.g., Todd C. Peppers
& Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Decision Making 29 (June 14,
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925705.
36. MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 10, at 5.
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review.37 In that vein, some scholars have argued that two informal
mechanisms—the cert pool and the “Rule of Three”—either by
themselves or in combination with Court membership, have influ-
enced the Court’s docket size. 
The cert pool, as stated above, was generated as a time-saving
mechanism for the Justices’ chambers as they filter out the “cert-
worthy” petitions from the frivolous ones.38 As many argue, though,
there are tremendous pressures on law clerks in the cert pool to
recommend that the Court deny review to a petition; clerks fear
mistakenly recommending the Court grant review on cases that
could make themselves, the Justice for whom they clerk, or the
Court look foolish.39 Scholars, former clerks, and even Justices
themselves wonder whether the cert pool creates an incentive for
law clerks to recommend denials and, thus, may have led to the
depleted merits docket. Kenneth Starr, for example, contends that
the cert pool has led to a depleted docket.40 He suggests that to avoid
personal and institutional embarrassment, clerks in the pool try to
find as many reasons as possible to deny a petition.41 
Others believe the evidence may support Starr’s contention, as
the decrease in the plenary docket ostensibly has coincided with the
rise of the cert pool.42 Justice Stevens, for one, agrees with Starr’s
hypothesis: “You stick your neck out as a clerk when you recom-
mend to grant a case. The risk-averse thing to do is to recommend
not to take a case. I think it accounts for the lessening of the
docket.”43
Former clerks also allude to this dynamic. Laura Ingraham, once
a clerk for Justice Thomas, stated: “You’re in perpetual fear of
making a mistake.”44 Other clerks attribute their reluctance to a
culture of restraint. One remarked that his practice was to “find
37. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a)-(c) (explaining the types of situations in which the Court is likely
to grant cert, and noting that the Court “rarely grant[s] [cert] when the asserted error consists
of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law”).
38. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 14, at 144.
40. Starr has argued that the cert pool has negatively impacted the Court’s review process
by giving too much discretion to young, inexperienced lawyers. Starr, supra note 6, at 1366.
41. Id. at 1376.
42. E.g., WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 14, at 143.
43. Id. at 144.
44. Id. at 129.
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every possible reason to deny cert. petitions.”45 Part of this was
institutional: “[T]here is ... the rule that anything that is avoidable
should be avoided.”46 One clerk described this rule as an “enormous
pressure not to take a case” and “an institutionalized inertia not to
grant cert.”47 Because the Court treats most cases as fungible, that
is, having the same value, clerks believe that “it really [does not]
matter if the Court ma[kes] a mistake in not taking a case.” To
them, “[i]t is better to let [the case] have a little extra time, because
if we [do not] grant cert, the [issue] will come up again.”48 
Moving away from anecdotal accounts, other scholars, such as
David Stras, use empirics to argue that the cert pool may have
contributed to the docket’s decline. In his study of the cert pool,
Stras examined cert pool memoranda and compared them to the
Court’s certiorari decisions.49 He found that when the cert pool
recommended the Court grant cert, the Court did so between 70 and
75 percent of the time.50 He also found a strong positive correlation
between the number of grant recommendations and the number of
plenary decisions.51 In other words, when the cert pool recommends
the Court grant cert, the Court’s decision to grant is strongly influ-
enced by that recommendation. This is important in explaining the
plenary docket’s decline because the cert pool “is considerably more
stingy in making grant recommendations than is the Court in its
decisions to grant plenary review.”52
Given the correlation between the cert pool and the Court’s
decision to grant cert, fewer recommendations from the cert pool
may help explain the docket’s decline. Although Stras cautions that
the “extent of that relationship is unclear,”53 he has examined and
rejected several other factors that may explain the decline including:
45. PERRY, supra note 25, at 218.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 221.
49. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the
Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 977 (2007). Specifically, Stras examined every pool
memo from October Terms 1984, 1985, 1991, and 1992. Id.
50. Id. at 979-80.
51. Id. at 987. Specifically, Stras found “[t]he Pearson correlation coefficient between
those two variables ... [to be] .998 at a statistical significance level greater than .01.” Id.
52. Id. at 972.
53. Id. at 995.
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a decline in the number of cert-worthy opinions, a decline in the
quality of cert petitions, and changes in personnel on the court.54 In
other words, Stras’s study supports the idea that the cert pool’s
recommendations influence the Court’s ultimate decision to grant
or deny cert.55
Other scholars writing before Stras’s study are less enthusiastic
about the cert pool’s ability to explain the decline. Margaret and
Richard Cordray argue that “the cert pool has not had much sys-
tematic influence on the votes cast by individual Justices to grant
or deny plenary review.”56 They claim this is the case for two rea-
sons.57 First, the Justices’ differing levels of attention to cert peti-
tions “does not correlate with their participation in the pool.”58 In
other words, one Justice may examine petitions more closely than
another Justice, but participation in the pool does not explain this
behavior. Second, variation exists in the Justices’ voting patterns
within the cert pool.59 Justices who participate in the cert pool vote
to grant or deny cert at different rates. The Cordrays argue, there-
fore, that the cert pool does not influence the size of the plenary
docket.
54. Id. at 987-90. Despite the strong relationship, the data leave room for independent
judgment of the Justices. Nevertheless, the data still support the hypothesis that some
meaningful relationship exists between the recommendations of the cert pool and the final
decisions of the Justices. Id. at 994-95 (“To be sure, a 30% disagreement rate in that category
does demonstrate that the Justices exercise some independent judgment in making their
decisions about whether to grant certiorari. However, the approximately 99% agreement in
all cases and the nearly 70% agreement in granted cases also reveal that the
recommendations of the cert pool are indeed related to the final decisions of the Justices on
petitions for certiorari.” (citations omitted)).
55. Id. at 996-97. He also found that the level of agreement on decisions to deny cert
between the Justices and the cert pool has increased over time; specifically, rates of
agreement increased when more Justices joined the cert pool. Id. at 992. The data suggested
that the rate of agreement has remained constant with respect to “hard” cases that the Court
grants. Id. at 994.
56. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s Plenary
Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 791 (2001).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 791-92. This explanation, however, is not entirely convincing. If it influences the
Justices, the cert pool may result in differing grant rates for those inside and outside the pool.
Nevertheless, it probably would not result in uniform voting patterns among the Justices.
Where the data are available, it would instead cause the Justices’ rates to decline relative to
their pre-cert pool rates.
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David O’Brien, too, suggests that no concrete evidence shows the
cert pool influenced the plenary docket.60 By drawing attention to
more cases, he argues that the cert pool could have influenced the
docket’s size in either direction. On the one hand, greater attention
to detail could have highlighted circuit splits, “which after further
scrutiny are deemed ‘tolerable’ or in need of ‘percolation.’”61 But just
that kind of “highlighting” also could have caused some Justices to
grant cert to settle such circuit divisions.62 He also notes “there is no
evidence that justices not in the cert pool give more attention to
petitions than those in the pool.”63 Put simply, O’Brien does not
think there is concrete evidence showing the cert pool influences the
Court’s docket.64
How, then, do the Cordrays and O’Brien explain the decline? In
their view, the primary factor influencing the decline is the Court’s
composition.65 They are not alone in this view. Preliminary support
for this hypothesis comes from Arthur Hellman and others. Hellman
contends that the Court’s membership, and the Justices’ views of
the Court’s role in deciding cases, explain the decrease in the ple-
nary docket.66 Justices who joined the Court in the late 1980s and
1990s, he argues, held a different view of the Court than their
predecessors.67 Specifically, they believed that “a relatively small
number of nationally binding precedents is sufficient to provide
doctrinal guidance for the resolution of recurring issues.”68 Thus, he
argues that the view held by the new Justices influenced the decline
in the Court’s docket.69
60. O’Brien, supra note 24, at 64; David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the
Cert. Pool, and the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 801-02
(1997) [hereinafter O’Brien, Shrinking Plenary Docket].
61. O’Brien, supra note 24, at 64; see also O’Brien, Shrinking Plenary Docket, supra note
60, at 802.
62. O’Brien, supra note 24, at 63; O’Brien, Shrinking Plenary Docket, supra note 60, at
802.
63. O’Brien, supra note 24, at 63.
64. See O’Brien, Shrinking Plenary Docket, supra note 60, at 802-03.
65. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 56, at 41; O’Brien, supra note 24, at 58.
66. Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.
403, 429-30.
67. Id. at 430.
68. Id. at 430-31.
69. See id. at 431-32.
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Like Hellman, O’Brien and the Cordrays look to Court member-
ship to explain the decline.70 The nature of their explanations,
however, differs in subtle ways. O’Brien’s argument, for instance, is
more attuned than the Cordrays to the interaction between mem-
bership and internal mechanisms.71 Specifically, O’Brien examines
how Court composition and the Rule of Three work in tandem to
influence the plenary docket.72 The Court’s Rule of Four holds that
when four Justices agree to grant cert, the Court grants plenary
review to the case and sets it on the merits docket for oral argu-
ment.73 The Rule of Three, however, allows a Justice to cast a Join-3
vote that will be counted as a vote to grant cert if at least three
other Justices vote to grant.74 If fewer than three other Justices vote
to grant cert, the Join-3 vote is counted as one to deny.75 O’Brien
contends that the Rule of Three, when combined with Court mem-
bership, can help explain the decline. When the Court lowered the
bar and allowed a Join-3 vote, plus three grant votes, to trigger
review, it created an initial spike in plenary review:76 with a lower
threshold for review, the Court could grant cert more easily and
more frequently.77 This lowered bar, perhaps combined with the
desire of Chief Justice Burger to fill the newly expanded oral
70. See sources cited supra note 65. 
71. See O’Brien, supra note 24, at 63.
72. Id. As noted above, O’Brien is skeptical about the cert pool’s impact on the declining
docket, though he does not rule it out entirely. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. He
notes that shortly after its adoption, for example, the cert pool may have increased the
number of grants because younger Justices deferred to older Justices not participating in the
cert pool. See O’Brien, supra note 24, at 63. Later, though, with more Justices participating
in it, the cert pool’s collectivity diminished the salience of circuit splits or other important
issues needing attention. See id. at 63-64. As we explained above, O’Brien could not make a
definitive conclusion about how the cert pool worked to influence the docket. Thus, without
further evidence, the data forced him to conclude that the cert pool, when combined with court
membership, influenced the docket’s decline. See id. at 64.
73. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
74. O’Brien, supra note 24, at 60; Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Join-3 Votes and
Supreme Court Agenda Setting 2 n.4 (June 8, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1568389.
75. O’Brien, supra note 24, at 60.
76. O’Brien, Shrinking Plenary Docket, supra note 60, at 798 (“Join-3 votes clearly lowered
the threshold for granting cases and contributed to the inflation of the plenary docket.”). The
plenary docket initially increased when Warren Burger took office. See, e.g., Arthur D.
Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925: The Plenary
Docket in the 1970's, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1734 (1978).
77. See O’Brien, supra note 24, at 60.
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argument calendar, may have resulted in the jump in cases heard
by the Court.78
The spike gave way to a drop in the 1980s, which O’Brien argues
resulted in part from the Court’s changing composition. Justice
Antonin Scalia and Justice Anthony Kennedy, for example, joined
the Court after Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell retired.
This was significant because Justices Scalia and Kennedy would
end up casting fewer Join-3 votes than their predecessors.79 O’Brien
notes that the docket continued to decline as Justices with a pen-
chant for Join-3 votes—Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, and
Blackmun—retired, making the docket look as though it shrank
precipitously.80 In this way, the Rule of Three interacted with the
changes in Court membership to push down the size of the plenary
docket.
Although discounting the Rule of Three,81 the Cordrays also argue
that the Court’s membership has influenced the decline of the
plenary docket.82 Their study examined grant rates of Justices from
the Burger Court and their later replacements.83 Like O’Brien, the
78. Id. at 61.
79. Id. at 62-63.
80. Id.
81. The Cordrays do note that the Rule of Three may have led “Justices with less definite
views on particular cases to opt for [the Rule of Three] ... rather than voting to deny,” or,
alternatively, “toward voting to grant” review. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 56, at 780.
Nevertheless, they conclude that “there is no necessary correlation between frequent use of
the Join-3 vote and a high overall grant rate.” Id. Their data show that Join-3 votes were not
a reliable indicator of Justices’ willingness to grant review. Id. at 780-81.
82. Id. at 776. The Cordrays also examined a variety of other potential factors to explain
the decline. These include Congress’s elimination of the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction, fewer
filings in certain subject areas, and the federal government seeking review less frequently.
Id. at 751-71. The decline in government review requests was the only factor that the
Cordrays found persuasive. Id. They also explored how greater homogeneity among the lower
courts may have influenced the docket. Id. at 771-76. They argued that the data suggest
realignment of lower courts “toward more ‘pro-government’ results—i.e., ‘statist realignment’
—[which] has led the Solicitor General to seek review less often in civil cases, with a
corresponding decline in such cases granted.” Id. at 773. The Cordrays are quick to note that
a pro-government alignment of the lower courts will influence grant rates only if that stance
accords with the Supreme Court’s ideological position. Id. at 774-75. It is for this reason that
they study and point to Court membership as the primary explanation for the docket’s decline.
83. Id. at 781-82. Specifically, the Cordrays looked at data on actual votes cast. Id. at 781.
They used data on every Justice from the Burger Court era. Id. at 781-82. For the Rehnquist
Court, they counted “conference votes from Justice Marshall’s docket books, which cover the
ensuing years until his retirement after the 1990 Term.” Id. at 782.
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Cordrays point to the appointments of Justices Kennedy and Scalia,
who “settled into abnegating roles in the discretionary review
process, voting to grant review less often than any other Justice.”84
The elevation of Justices Scalia and Kennedy had a tremendous
effect on the Court’s docket, “almost erasing the complement of
votes cast by an average Justice for plenary review in a given
Term.”85 Although Justice Rehnquist was an exception to this hy-
pothesis—he changed his voting patterns on his own86—the influ-
ence of the new Justices was substantial. The Cordrays argue that
nearly all of the later appointments—Justice Souter (replacing
Justice Brennan), Justice Ginsburg (replacing Justice White), and
Justice Breyer (replacing Justice Blackmun)—influenced the size of
the docket.87 Based on the Justices’ grant rates, they argue that “the
Court’s personnel changes over this decade were a substantial
independent cause of the remarkable decline in its docket.”88 
David Stras, although positing the influence of the cert pool,89
also found that the Court’s membership influenced its docket size.90
Stras studied the rates at which Justices voted to grant certiorari.91
Like the Cordrays and O’Brien, Stras found that during the docket’s
decline, newly appointed Justices voted to grant certiorari less
frequently than the Justices whom they replaced.92
84. Id. at 785.
85. Id.
86. Id. (noting that, during the replacements of Justices Burger and Powell, Justice
Rehnquist’s total votes for plenary review went “from keeping pace with Justice White in an
aggressively pro-review first tier on the Court ... to ... eventually relinquish[ing] ... second
place to Justice Blackmun,” and arguing that this abrupt shift “seems to be directly linked to
Justice Rehnquist’s perception of his new and distinct role as the Chief Justice”).
87. Id. at 786-89.
88. Id. at 790. The Cordrays also argue that the federal government’s rate of victory
influenced the Court’s docket; with more government victories in lower courts, the necessity
for review by a pro-government Court diminished. Id. at 775 & n.201, 794.
89. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Declining Plenary Docket: A Membership-Based
Explanation, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 151 (2010). 
90. Id. at 152. 
91. Id. at 155-57.
92. Id. at 157-58. Stras offers specific examples:
First, Justice Souter, who voted to grant plenary review an average of 83 times
per Term from 1990 to 1993, replaced Justice Brennan, who voted to grant
plenary review an average of 129.25 times per Term from 1986 to 1989. Second,
Justice Thomas, who voted to grant plenary review an average of only 71.7 times
per Term from 1991 to 1993, replaced Justice Marshall, who voted to grant
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Why might that be? One obvious answer is that the new Justices
held different views about when the Court should hear a case on the
merits. Another answer is that changes in membership affected the
voting patterns of existing Justices.93 Likely it was both. In empha-
sizing the Court’s turnover as a factor in the declining docket, Stras
pays close attention to Justice White,94 who had a well-known view
that the Supreme Court should resolve as many circuit splits as
possible.95 In keeping with the dynamic effect of the Justices’ voting
patterns on one another, Justice John Paul Stevens claims that
Justice White was not only outspoken but persuasive; a “significant
number of ... [drafts of Justice White’s] dissent[s] from denial of
certiorari remained unpublished[ ] because [they] actually per-
suaded one or more of Justice White’s colleagues to change a vote
from a ‘deny’ to a ‘grant.’”96 
Stras notes that “the substitution of Justice Ginsburg for Justice
White likely had a transformative effect on the size of the plenary
docket.”97 Part of this, it seems, was unavoidable, given how
plenary review an average of 124.6 times per Term from 1986 to 1991. Finally
and most significantly, the substitution of Justice Ginsburg for Justice White
likely had a transformative effect on the size of the plenary docket. Justice
White voted to grant plenary review a prodigious 215.6 times per Term, on
average, between 1986 and 1992, or 67% more often than Justice Brennan, who
voted to grant plenary review the second most often of any member of the court
during the period. Meanwhile, consistent with her scholarly writings urging the
Court to exercise self-control in managing the size of its plenary docket, Justice
Ginsburg voted to grant plenary review during the October 1993 Term only 63
times, or 29.2% as often as her predecessor.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
93. O’Brien notes that dissenting from a denial of cert is a strategic behavior. O’Brien,
Shrinking Plenary Docket, supra note 60, at 794. That is, dissents from denial are designed
to be tools of persuasion—attempts to prod Justices to reconsider their votes to deny. Id.
94. Stras, supra note 89, at 157-58. He also paid close attention to Justice Souter
(replacing Justice Brennan) and Justice Thomas (replacing Justice Marshall). Id. at 157.
Combined with Justice Ginsburg’s replacement of Justice White, Stras found that by 1993,
these “three membership changes alone had accounted for an average reduction in favor of
plenary review.” Id. at 158.
95. Id. at 155.
96. John Paul Stevens, “Cheers!” A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 1994 BYU L. REV.
209, 217.
97. Stras, supra note 89, at 157. Kevin Scott also has found that Justice White’s view of
the Court’s role influenced the size of the plenary docket. Kevin M. Scott, Shaping the
Supreme Court’s Federal Certiorari Docket, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 191, 203 (2006) (“[T]he positive
effect on the Court’s workload of the shared tenure of Justices White and Blackmun is quite
substantial, increasing the size of the Court’s docket by 19.43 cases each Term; their shared
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faithfully Justice White practiced his philosophy. “Justice White
voted to grant plenary review a prodigious 215.6 times per Term, on
average, between 1986 and 1992, or 67% more often than Justice
Brennan, who voted to grant plenary review the second most often
of any member of the Court during the period.”98 The other part was
a result of Justice White’s replacement, “Justice Ginsburg[, who]
voted to grant plenary review during the October 1993 Term only 63
times, or 29.2% as often as her predecessor.”99 Based on this data,
Stras argues that Court membership—Justice White’s in particular
—contributed to the declining docket.100
Membership change is, of course, an intuitively pleasing hypothe-
sis, as some Justices simply have different normative conceptions of
the certiorari process and, more specifically, the Court’s role in legal
development. Because the certiorari process is the gateway to a final
decision, it is reasonable to assume that Justices with one perspec-
tive of the Court’s role in legal development will view the docket in
a different light than Justices with another, perhaps competing,
perspective. In short, Court membership—and the views of Justices
—matters, and might explain the depleted docket. 
2. External Mechanisms
Mechanisms external to the Court also influence how it sets its
agenda and, thus, its docket size. By external mechanisms, we mean
those factors that the Court itself cannot control—namely, its juris-
diction. Although the Justices ultimately control the cert process,
external factors—the Constitution, federal statutes, and, ultimately,
Congress—control its jurisdictional limits. 
On several occasions, Congress has altered the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction, which, in turn, has affected the Court’s docket. The
Judiciary Act of 1891 was Congress’s first attempt to ease the
burden of the Court’s workload. That Act created the United States
Courts of Appeals and carved out a small discretionary docket for
impact was even greater than previously imagined.”).
98. Stras, supra note 89, at 157.
99. Id. at 158.
100. Id. at 157-58.
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the Supreme Court.101 When it later enacted the Judiciary Act of
1925, Congress once again limited the Court’s mandatory jurisdic-
tion and expanded its discretionary docket.102 And, most recently in
1988, Congress passed legislation that removed virtually all of the
Court’s mandatory jurisdiction, leaving Justices free to select the
cases they wished to hear.103 Some have argued that this 1988 Act
led quickly to the Court’s depleted docket.104
Indeed, there is at least anecdotal evidence to believe that the
Justices themselves viewed the 1988 Act as a tool to decrease their
workload. For example, in the years leading up to passage of the
Act, Chief Justice Burger drew attention to the Court’s increased
workload.105 When Congress debated the 1988 Act, Justices wrote a
letter to Senator Robert Kastenmeier106 complaining that their
mandatory jurisdiction consumed too much of their time.107 Their
solution was to remove the mandatory jurisdiction under which the
Court chafed.108
Naturally, scholars eager to test this hypothesis examined the
Court’s docket size before and since the Act’s passage. Yet the
results thus far have not supported the hypothesis that the removal
of mandatory jurisdiction led to the diminished docket. Arthur
Hellman’s study, for example, suggests that the Act was not a
101. Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. For a brief summary of the 1891 Act, see
History of the Federal Judiciary: Landmark Judicial Legislation, FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_12.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
102. Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 937.
103. Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257-58, 2104 (1994)).
104. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 66, at 409. 
105. Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 685-86 (1984) (citing Warren
Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442 (1983)).
106. Senator Kastenmeier, along with eighteen other cosponsors, introduced the Act in bill
form in the House. Id. at 685 n.4.
107. Id. at 687 & n.18. That was not the first time the Court claimed it was overburdened.
Similar motives drove Congress to enact the aforementioned 1925 Act. Margaret Meriwether
Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in
Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 390 & n.5 (2004) (quoting Chief Justice
William Taft in a 1924 letter to Senator Copeland in which Taft lobbied for greater
discretionary jurisdiction).
108. Hellman, supra note 66, at 409 (quoting Justice Anthony M. Kennedy); id. at 410
(quoting Justice Antonin Scalia, who predicted a decline in the Court’s Commerce Clause
cases after the 1988 Act).
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causal factor.109 Hellman notes that the 1988 Act repealed manda-
tory jurisdiction in civil cases but did not affect criminal juris-
diction.110 Thus, Hellman expected a “more pronounced [reduction]
on the civil side than in criminal prosecutions.”111 His data did not
support such an inference, however. There was a universal reduc-
tion of civil and criminal cases during the time period he studied.112
As a result, Hellman argues the 1988 Act did not substantially
affect the Court’s plenary docket.113 
The Cordrays, too, dismiss the 1988 Act’s role in reducing the
Court’s plenary docket.114 They examined and compared two sets of
cases: the number of appeals given plenary review in the four Terms
before the 1988 Act and the number of cases granted cert that would
have formerly had a right of appeal in the four Terms after the 1988
Act.115 The Cordrays found that “[t]he reduction in these cases as
compared to the remainder of the Court’s discretionary docket was
... quite modest, amounting to only one or two cases per Term.”116
They conclude, therefore, that the 1988 Act did not influence the
size of the Court’s docket.117
3. Principal-Agent Theory
A third general explanation for the Court’s shrinking docket turns
on principal-agent theory, focusing primarily on the ideological
distance between the Supreme Court and lower courts. Some, for
example, have argued that this ideological distance is precisely the
reason the Supreme Court granted cert less often during the
109. Id. at 409-10.
110. See id. at 410.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 412.
114. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 56, at 758.
115. Id. at 755.
116. Id. at 757. Other external mechanisms have also received scholarly treatment, such
as the number of cases filed in specific areas and the growth of the Supreme Court bar. See
id. at 758-63; Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1510-21 (2008)
(postulating that the Supreme Court bar could have influenced the docket by using its
expertise to persuade clerks that cases are not worthy of cert and by raising the standard of
argument by which cert decisions were made).
117. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 56, at 758.
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Reagan-Bush years than in the preceding years.118 In the Reagan-
Bush era, conservative jurists dominated the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts.119 Lower tribunals largely shared Justices’
ideological beliefs and, thus, could be trusted to vote just as the
Supreme Court would have voted had it heard the case.120 This
ideological alignment meant the Supreme Court had less need to
audit the lower courts.121 In this vein, Justice Souter once hypothe-
sized that the Court’s decreased caseload was a function of “a
diminished level of philosophical division within the federal courts
from which so much of the conflicting opinions tend to arise.”122 
This outlook recognizes that the Supreme Court sits atop a judi-
cial hierarchy, which means that the behavior of those tribunals
beneath it might influence how extensively it must supervise them.
To examine this relationship, scholars have employed principal-
agent theory. Although criticized by some,123 principal-agent theory
is a useful theoretical tool to explain the conditions under which the
Supreme Court reviews lower court decisions. 
Principal-agent theory argues that an actor, the principal, will
enter into a relationship with another, the agent, in the pursuit of
a goal.124 “The primary reason for [creating a principal-agent
relationship] is that the agent has an advantage in terms of exper-
tise or information.”125 Thus, to pursue his goals more effectively,
the principal engages the services of the agent. Yet, the principal
must solve two problems. First, the principal lacks information as
to whether the agent will perform as sought—the adverse selection
problem.126 Second, once hired, the agent may in fact engage in
118. See, e.g., id. at 771.
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id.
122. Shannon Duffy, Inside the Highest Court: Souter Describes Justices’ Relationship,
Caseload Trend, PA. L. WKLY., Apr. 17, 1995, at 28.
123. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial
Hierarchy, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 552-61 (2011) (criticizing the blanket application of simple
principle-agent theory to the relationship between the Supreme Court and appellate courts).
124. See Gary J. Miller & Andrew B. Whitford, Trust and Incentives in Principal-Agent
Negotiations: The ‘Insurance/Incentive Trade-Off,’ 14 J. THEORETICAL POL. 231, 233-39 (2002);
Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 756 (1984).
125. Gary J. Miller, Solutions to Principal-Agent Models in Firms, in HANDBOOK OF NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 349, 349 (Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005).
126. See Moe, supra note 124, at 756-57.
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behavior the principal dislikes—the shirking problem.127 Indeed, the
agent may act orthogonally to the stated goals of the principal. To
mitigate against these problems, principals must, among other acts,
set up oversight mechanisms to gauge the quality of the agent’s
work.128
Scholars have described the relationship between the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts in principal-agent terms.129 Applying
this theory, the Supreme Court acts as the principal and the lower
courts act as the Supreme Court’s agents. As the philosophical
division between the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court
grows, the more often the Court must grant plenary review to audit
those lower courts.130 Thus, as the lower courts and Supreme Court
127. See Susan B. Haire, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Donald R. Songer, Appellate Court
Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 143,
146 (2003).
128. For interesting examples of principal-agent analysis applied to Congress’s relationship
with the executive bureaucracy, see Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz,
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI.
165, 165-69 (1984); Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-
Agent Perspective (with Applications to the SEC), 44 PUB. CHOICE 147, 151-58 (1984); Barry
R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory
Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 768-70 (1983). But see
Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of ‘Congressional Dominance,’ 12 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 475, 477-90 (1987).
129. See, e.g., Cameron, Segal & Songer, supra note 13, at 101, 101-03, 114-15; Tracey E.
George & Albert H. Yoon, The Federal Court System: A Principal-Agent Perspective, 47 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 819, 825-31 (2003); Tracey E. George & Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court
Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 175,
188 (2001); Haire, Lindquist & Songer, supra note 127, at 146-50; Stefanie A. Lindquist,
Susan B. Haire & Donald R. Songer, Supreme Court Auditing of the US Courts of Appeals: An
Organizational Perspective, 17 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 607, 610-11, 619-22 (2007); see
also Scott, supra note 97, at 192-94, 201-02 (finding a weak and insubstantial relationship
between the ideological distance separating the Supreme Court and courts of appeals, and
finding no evidence that lower court heterogeneity increases the Supreme Court’s workload);
Tajuana Massie, Precedent or Ideology? Exploring the Influence of the U.S. Supreme Court
on Decision-Making by the U.S. Courts of Appeals 29 (Sept. 2-5, 2004) (unpublished paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n), available at http://www.
allacademic.com/meta/p60457_index.html; Kevin M. Scott, An Exploration of the Motivations
of Court of Appeals Justices 2 (Apr. 3-6, 2003) (unpublished paper presented at the annual
meeting of the Midwest Political Sci. Ass’n), available at http://www.kevinmscott.com/
ScottAPSA2003.pdf.
130. This is distinct from the concept of pure lower-court homogeneity—sometimes called
“philosophical realignment”—which asserts that the Court’s docket fell because of fewer
disagreements among lower courts. See, e.g., Cordray & Cordray, supra note 56, at 771; Scott,
supra note 97, at 193-94 (noting the difference between ideological distance and lower-court
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become more ideologically congruent, the Supreme Court’s need to
audit lower courts decreases. 
Figure 4 represents the principal-agent argument using a spatial
model. The model represents the ideal point of the median Justice
on the Supreme Court (J) as well as the preferences of the pivotal
members of two hypothetical circuits (CAx and CAy).131 The vertical
ticks on the line reflect the policies each pivotal actor prefers to all
others in the policy space. As the distance between the Supreme
Court and a circuit grows, the Supreme Court becomes more likely
to disagree with the lower court and, concurrently, more likely to
review that court’s decisions. Thus, because the Supreme Court and
CAx disagree ideologically, the Supreme Court will be forced to audit
the lower court more frequently to ensure that it complies with
Court policy. Conversely, the Supreme Court will be forced to review
CAy less frequently, as that court shares the same general views as
the Supreme Court.132 
heterogeneity). Philosophical realignment and principal-agent theory may be related. A
Supreme Court that frequently audits the behavior of lower courts—or that gives broad and
stern rulings—can stimulate greater philosophical realignment.
131. An actor’s ideal point is the point in policy space that she prefers to all others. In the
model here, we assume that all actors have continuous, single-peaked, symmetric preferences
on a unidimensional policy scale. We also assume that they prefer policy that is closest to
their ideal points. All actors know each others’ preferences. Because the actors’ preferences
are categorized fully by the model, they will choose equilibrium voting strategies. See
generally Ryan J. Owens, The Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting, 54
AM. J. POL. SCI. 412, 412-17 (2010).
132. Figure 4 represents the ideological distance between the Supreme Court (J) and two
hypothetical courts of appeals (CAx and CAy).
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Figure 4: Spatial Representation of Ideological Distance Between
Circuit Courts of Appeals and Supreme Court133
Existing empirical scholarship uses principal-agent theory to
explain the Supreme Court’s decision to review lower court deci-
sions. For example, Charles Cameron, Jeffrey Segal, and Donald
Songer examined how the Court uses signals and indices to de-
termine which cases to review and, more specifically, whether the
Court will follow a lower court’s decision to admit evidence in a
criminal case.134 When a lower court renders a decision that accords
with Supreme Court ideology in a case, Cameron and his colleagues
found that the Supreme Court need not rely on indices to determine
whether to review because the signal—here, admitting the evidence
—mirrors the Court’s own goals.135 Conversely, when the lower court
makes a decision that the Supreme Court dislikes—that is, it sends
a signal of which the Court is skeptical—Justices will rely on other
indices to verify the lower court’s signal.136 In sum, when the re-
viewing court has reason to question the lower court, it will become
more likely to audit that court.
Similarly, Ryan Black and Ryan Owens argue that when deter-
mining which cases to review, Supreme Court Justices rely on both
the identity of lower court judges and the ideological disposition of
the lower court decision.137 The authors examined a random sample
CAx CAy J
133. This figure represents the ideological distance between the Supreme Court (J) and two
hypothetical circuit courts of appeals (CAx and CAy).
134. Cameron, Segal & Songer, supra note 13, at 103-08 (explaining theoretical model and
hypotheses).
135. Id. at 112-13.
136. Id.
137. See Black & Owens, supra note 13 (manuscript at 1).
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of 358 agenda-setting petitions decided across the first eight Terms
of the Rehnquist Court (from 1986 to 1993), using private archival
data culled from the papers of former Justice Harry A. Blackmun.138
Their results show that Supreme Court Justices are most likely to
audit ideologically incongruent lower court decisions rendered by
ideological foes, and are least likely to audit ideologically congruent
decisions rendered by lower court allies.139 At the same time, and
perhaps more importantly, Justices are more likely to review ideo-
logically incongruent lower court decisions made by ideological foes
than those rendered by lower court allies.140 Overall, then, they find
that lower court ideological congruence with the Supreme Court
influenced whether the Court granted review.141 
Other studies likewise employ principal-agent theory to explain
why the Supreme Court reviews cases.142 Susan Haire, Stefanie
Lindquist, and Donald Songer describe a three-tiered principal-
agent system. One tier is composed of the Supreme Court and fed-
eral courts of appeals.143 The second tier is composed of the circuit
courts and federal district courts.144 The third tier is composed of the
Supreme Court and the district courts.145 The authors investigated
these relationships, as well as the Supreme Court’s role in mediat-
138. Id. Blackmun’s docket sheets are housed by Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Harold
J. Spaeth. See DIGITAL ARCHIVE OF THE PAPERS OF HARRY A. BLACKMUN, http://epstein.
law.northwestern.edu/blackmun.php?p=0 (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
139. See Black & Owens, supra note 13 (manuscript at 8) (finding these results generally
and when comparing liberal and conservative Justices facing a potential review of liberal or
conservative panels).
140. Id. To be sure, not all scholars believe the principal-agent analysis explains docket
shifts. The Cordrays, for example, see judicial realignment as explaining only government
litigation. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 56, at 771-76 (arguing that judicial realignment
should be doubted because there are still numerous circuit splits, and because the
philosophical alignment of the courts did not shift when a Democratic president took office
and made new judicial appointments).
141. Black & Owens, supra note 13 (manuscript at 8). 
142. See, e.g., Haire, Lindquist & Songer, supra note 127, at 144-50; see also Hellman,
supra note 76, at 1757-58 (explaining that, among other factors, lower court judges can
influence the number of cases for which the Supreme Court grants cert, thereby implying a
principal-agent relationship between them); Scott, supra note 129 (manuscript at 18-20)
(testing both Justice ideology and ideological distance between the Supreme Court and
appellate courts, finding that Justices’ ideologies are the strongest predictors of granting cert,
and asserting that further research into alternative explanations is necessary).
143. Haire, Lindquist & Songer, supra note 127, at 146-47.
144. Id. at 147.
145. Id. at 147-48.
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ing the relationship between the district and circuit courts.146 Their
results confirm that the federal system functions in an integrated
fashion. As Supreme Court scrutiny of a circuit court increases, that
circuit court is more likely to audit lower district courts.147 At the
same time, circuit courts attempt to serve both their own policy
preferences148 and those of the Supreme Court.149 
Despite the empirical scholarship showing that ideological con-
siderations motivate Justices’ decisions to grant or deny review of
cases,150 it is unclear whether ideological homogeneity between the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts led to a decrease in the
Court’s docket. Scholars still must test whether Justice Souter’s
hypothesis is correct. 
II. WHY CARE ABOUT A DIMINISHED DOCKET?
So far, we have explained how the Court sets its agenda.151 We
presented evidence to show that the Court hears fewer cases these
days than any other time in modern history.152 We also delineated
a variety of scholarly explanations for that dynamic153—expla-
nations that we will examine empirically. For now, however, we
seek to highlight why it all matters. Should we care that the
Supreme Court grants certiorari less frequently than ever before?
Should policymakers and legal actors cast a skeptical glance
towards the Court’s minimal docket? Should the Court’s depleted
docket receive serious attention? Quite clearly, yes.
We argue that policymakers and the legal community should care
about the Court’s docket size for at least four reasons.154 First, a
146. Id. at 147-50, 154-55.
147. Id. at 161.
148. The authors found that district court judges who were ideologically close to the circuit
court were less likely to be reversed. Id. at 159.
149. Additionally, the circuit courts were more likely to affirm when the district court’s
policy was consistent with the Supreme Court, and the level of attention the Supreme Court
gave a circuit also affected the interactions between the district and circuit courts. Id. at 161.
150. See Black & Owens, supra note 13 (manuscript at 6).
151. See supra Part I.A.
152. See supra Part I.B.
153. See supra Part I.C.
154. To be sure, some argue that we should not care because a smaller docket is unprob-
lematic or will simply resolve itself. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, If It Ain’t Broke ..., 119
YALE L.J. ONLINE 67 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/01/07/wilkinson.html. Others, such
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Court that hears few cases leaves important legal questions on the
table. This can increase uncertainty among the lower court judges
who must apply the law and parties who must operate within its
confines. Second, a smaller docket can lead to a Supreme Court out
of touch with the major legal issues of the day. Third, a small docket
may put the Court in a position to be “captured” by certain interests
or actors. And, finally, a small docket might cause public opinion to
turn against the Court, leading to a loss of legitimacy for the insti-
tution whose strongest reservoir of power is legitimacy.
A. A Depleted Docket Risks Leaving Important Cases Undecided
Justice White viewed the Supreme Court as the unifier of law. He
believed that the Court should resolve as many circuit splits as
possible and unify the law.155 If we subscribe to Justice White’s
philosophy—that important cases, especially those that evince con-
flict among the lower courts, must be reviewed by the Court—the
declining docket poses a clear and significant problem. According to
this perspective, a depleted docket is normatively bad because it
likely means that the Court is resolving fewer circuit splits. Justice
White was not alone. Chief Justice Rehnquist, whose tendency to
grant cert admittedly fell during his tenure,156 also believed that the
law needed clarification and unification. He thought that cases
as Sanford Levinson, have suggested that we cannot answer the question in a straightforward
manner; the question is contingent on our conception of the Court’s role. Sanford Levinson,
Assessing the Supreme Court’s Current Caseload: A Question of Law or Politics?, 119 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 99 (2010), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/02/01/ levinson.html. In that
vein, Hellman postulated four functions of the Supreme Court: “The Court delineates the
limits of governmental authority as against claims of individual liberty; it marks the
boundaries between state and national power; it interprets and clarifies the vast body of
federal statutory and common law; and it supervises the operation of the federal courts.”
Hellman, supra note 76, at 1716. Professor Paul Freund and others, when contemplating
whether the size of the Supreme Court’s docket warranted a national court of appeals,
described three roles of the Supreme Court: “to define and vindicate the rights guaranteed by
the Constitution, to assure the uniformity of federal law, and to maintain the constitutional
distribution of powers in our federal union.” FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY
GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, 57 F.R.D. 573, 578 (1972). It is helpful to
bear in mind these conceptions of the Court when examining the importance of the Supreme
Court’s declining docket.
155. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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should be resolved, not stewed until tender: “[T]o ... suggest that it
is actually desirable to allow important questions of federal law to
‘percolate’ in the lower courts for a few years before the Supreme
Court takes them on seems to me a very strange suggestion; at best
it is making a virtue of necessity.”157 Chief Justice Rehnquist was
concerned with the need to decide national law.158 He did not
endorse the idea of percolation: “We are not engaged in a scientific
experiment or in an effort to square the circle.”159 The Court’s role
was not, as he saw it, to allow uncertainty in hopes of achieving the
“best” outcome. It was instead, among other things, a unifier of
national law—and that was the reason he advocated some twenty-
five years ago for the creation of something like a national court of
appeals.160 To him, it was preposterous that one federal statute
could produce two rules “simply because” two circuit courts dis-
agreed on its meaning.161 In supporting a national court of appeals,
Chief Justice Rehnquist wished to avoid forcing the Court to choose
between its “active role in constitutional adjudication and its active
role in statutory adjudication.”162 He believed that the Court should
decide more cases, but recognized that, logistically, it could not. A
smaller docket meant uncertainty in the law, and, without cer-
tainty, the law does not serve one of its main purposes: to demarcate
the boundaries within which people can act legally and without
retribution.163 
To be sure, concern over the Court’s docket size may depend on
how one perceives the Court’s role. Justice Brennan, for example,
thought that part of the Court’s role was “to define the rights
157. William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1, 11 (1986). For a response, see Arthur Hellman, Preserving the Essential Role of the Supreme
Court: A Comment on Justice Rehnquist’s Proposal, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 15 (1986).
158. See Rehnquist, supra note 157, at 12 (“In short, we need ... more national decision-
making capacity than the Supreme Court as presently constituted can furnish.”).
159. Id. at 11.
160. See id. at 12. 
161. Id. (“Congress should not be held to have laid down one rule in North Carolina and
another rule in North Dakota simply because the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagree with one another on the meaning of a
federal statute.”).
162. Id. at 14.
163. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897) (explaining the predictive role of the law).
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guaranteed by the Constitution.”164 He believed the Court’s ability
to do this increased as the number of cases it decided increased.
When the Court hears and decides more cases, he argued, it clarifies
—and probably expands—the meaning of important constitutional
principles. As such, rights are enhanced, as is the power of the
Court.
Even if one believes, alternatively, that the Court should take a
more passive role, a small docket nevertheless might diminish the
Court’s importance. A small docket could afford the Court less op-
portunity to put its stamp of approval on actions taken by the
elected branches. What is more, hearing few cases could put the
Court’s importance on the line. The Court arguably gains institu-
tional importance by hearing and deciding cases. And as the number
of cases on which it renders judgments declines, the Court’s impor-
tance in policymaking could drift toward irrelevance. Finally, as the
Court's caseload declines, the potential effect of each decision in-
creases. On its own, this is not necessarily a problem. Yet if the
Court miscalculates in these cases, the effects of the error could be
greater than an erroneous decision among numerous other correct
decisions. In short, the smaller the denominator, the larger the
marginal effects of wrongly decided cases.
Whatever the appropriate role for the Court, fewer cases could
minimize the Court’s effectiveness and leave important legal issues
on the table.
B. A Depleted Docket May Leave the Court Out of Touch
Not only does a depleted docket leave important issues unre-
solved, it also can lead to an out-of-touch Court. Indeed, some argue
that this is exactly what has happened. Frederick Schauer, for
example, argues that the Court simply does not have enough—or
sufficiently accurate—information about the cases it chooses to
hear, leaving it with less certainty over the effect of those deci-
sions.165 The fewer cases the Court decides, the more pronounced
164. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 107, at 394 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., The
National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 473, 482 (1973)).
165. See Frederick Schauer, Is It Important to Be Important?: Evaluating the Supreme
Court’s Case-Selection Process, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 77, 78-79 (2009), http://yalelawjournal.
2012] SUPREME COURT’S SHRINKING DOCKET 1255
these selection effects become—and the greater risk of error in not
deciding a case.166 To place Schauer’s argument within this Article:
the smaller the docket, the more likely that the Court will fail to
decide an important case and, when it does decide a case, it could
decide the wrong issue. 
Arthur Hellman raises a related concern. His concern is not
necessarily about insufficient legal guidance to lower courts but,
rather, about the idiosyncratic nature of the Court’s decisions.167
Lower courts decide a variety of cases and apply the same rules in
a variety of contexts. The Supreme Court, by contrast, decides fewer
issues, operates less frequently, and applies fewer rules in fewer
factual contexts. Hellman thinks this is cause for concern. Deciding
only “isolated cases at long intervals” leads to Justices who make
decisions under conditions of uncertainty.168 At the same time,
Hellman argues, the potential for the Court to skew the law or
strain its relationships with lower courts increases as its merits
docket drops. The fewer opinions it issues, the more likely that the
effects of idiosyncratic or skewed decisions will be felt by judges,
lawyers, and laypeople.169
Less work for the Supreme Court is not commensurate with fewer
decision errors. Indeed, without the proper information, the Court
may make a critical mistake by not hearing a case. And the fact
remains that, for a variety of reasons, the Court lacks perfect or
even accurate information about the variety of cases it reviews for
org/2009/12/09/schauer.html (“[The Court] has decided no cases determining the authority of
a President to commit troops to combat outside of the United States, whether in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Kosovo, or anywhere else. And although, of course, the Supreme Court’s structural and
procedural decisions will have an indirect impact on the substance of policy, the Court has not
directly decided cases involving health care policy, federal bailouts of banks and automobile
manufacturers, climate change, the minimum wage, and the optimal rate of immigration. And
nothing the Court has decided for years is even in the neighborhood of addressing questions
involving mortgage defaults, executive compensation, interest rates, Israel and Palestine, the
nuclear capabilities of Iran and North Korea, gasoline prices, and the creation of new jobs.”).
166. As Schauer puts it: “[T]here can be errors of inaction as well as of action, and ... it is
an error to engage in a process of institutional design without taking into account the
likelihood and harm of errors of mistaken inaction along with those of mistaken action.” Id.
at 85.
167. Hellman, supra note 66, at 435.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 436.
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cert.170 Additionally, this lack of information can result in idiosyn-
cratic decisions, which can skew the law and rupture relationships
with lower courts. When the Court hears fewer cases, it exacerbates
these problems. 
C. A Depleted Docket Might Lead to the Excessive Influence of
Certain Parties or Interests
In addition to unsettled law and a hampered Court, a small
docket may lead to the excessive influence of certain parties or
interests. Scholars often complain that organized interests exert
too much control in politics and upon the Court.171 Copyright law
scholars, for example, lament how Disney single-handedly induced
Congress to extend copyright protection by twenty years.172 In ad-
ministrative law, special interest groups often “capture” agencies in
areas ranging from gun regulation173 to aviation rules174 to copyright
policy.175
170. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
171. For an overview of the influence of organized interests on the Court, see PAUL M.
COLLINS, FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
17 (2008); Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae Before the Supreme Court:
Who Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782, 802 (1990); Gregory A. Caldeira &
John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1111 (1988) [hereinafter Caldeira & Wright, Organized Interests];
Thomas G. Hansford, Information Provision, Organizational Constraints, and the Decision to
Submit an Amicus Curiae Brief in a U.S. Supreme Court Case, 57 POL. RES. Q. 219, 226
(2004); Kevin T. McGuire & Gregory A. Caldeira, Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law
of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 717, 724 (1993);
Ryan J. Owens & Lee Epstein, Amici Curiae During the Rehnquist Years, 89 JUDICATURE 127,
128 (2005).
172. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 217-18 (2006).
173. See, e.g., Timothy Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1247, 1253 (2000).
174. See, e.g., Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The Federal
Aviation Administration, “Agency Capture,” and Airline Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 381, 384 (2002).
175. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 27 (2001); see also David A. Simon, Teaching
Without Infringement: A New Model for Educational Fair Use, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 453, 528 (2010).
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Recently, Richard Lazarus highlighted the potential capture of
the Supreme Court. He argued that the Supreme Court bar—a
highly specialized and powerful group of attorneys—substantially
influences the Court’s decision to grant or deny cert.176 To show this,
Lazarus studied cert petition grant rates from 1980 to 2008.
Specifically, he examined the rate at which the Court granted cert
when “expert Supreme Court advocate[s]”177 sought review.178 He
found that, over the years, expert practitioners continually gained
influence over the Court’s docket.179 In 1980, for example, the Court
granted cert in 5.8 percent of cases brought by expert practitio-
ners.180 By 2007 and 2008, that rate had increased to 53.8 percent
and 55.5 percent, respectively.181
This capture, Lazarus fears, skews the Court’s docket toward
issues that are not “truly the most important for the nation.”182
Instead, the cases that the Court hears reflect the preferences of a
small cadre of lawyers and their clients.183 The Justices and their
clerks cannot pay close attention to the thousands of cert petitions
filed each year.184 What constitutes an information deficit for the
Justices, then, becomes a “tactical advantage” for the Supreme
Court bar.185 They have the reputation, forum, and experience to
176. Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the High Court, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 89, 90
(2009), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/01/24/lazarus.html; Lazarus, supra note 116, at 1509-10
(explaining the rise of the Supreme Court bar and also suggesting several ways in which it
could have contributed to the docket’s decline); see also Hellman, supra note 76, at 1757-58
(noting that interest groups have become more involved in litigating cases that raise policy
issues rather than litigating cases for an individual client, and noting that civil rights cases
in the early 1970s were brought by way of defense, but by 1978 most were brought by
individuals affirmatively claiming that the government violated their rights).
177. He defines “expert Supreme Court advocate” as “an attorney [who] either has to have
presented at least five oral arguments before the Court or be affiliated with a practice whose
current members have argued at least ten cases.” Lazarus, supra note 176, at 90.
178. Lazarus notes that he excluded from consideration those cases in which the Solicitor
General was a petitioner. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. Levinson’s aforementioned claim—that our worry is contingent—applies here. See
supra note 154. Lazarus thinks that the Court’s job is to decide only the really important
issues. Someone like Justice White would disagree.
183. Lazarus, supra note 176, at 91-92.
184. Id. at 93.
185. Id. at 94.
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argue persuasively that their cases are the ones the Court should
hear. 
Lazarus is not alone; additional empirical evidence drives home
the point that elite attorneys can influence Justices. Consider the
work of Kevin McGuire, who examined the success of Washington,
D.C. attorneys.186 McGuire found that Washington, D.C.-based
attorneys are much more likely than non-Washington attorneys to
succeed before the Court.187 In a similar work, McGuire found that
attorneys who are more experienced than their opposing counsel are
more likely to win their cases.188 Although there are a host of factors
that lead to their victories—such as the incentive to provide more
credible information and the ability to key in on the Justices’
individual proclivities—the unmistakable fact is that elite attorneys
observe more victories before the Court and, thus, are in a position
to exert heightened influence over Justices.189 When the Court’s
docket is small, the proportion of influence these attorneys exert
over federal law grows dramatically.
Of course, no attorney can compare to attorneys in the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) in terms of influencing the Court. A
smaller Court docket surely, then, promises to increase the influ-
ence of the executive branch. Consider recent work by Ryan Black
and Ryan Owens.190 The authors examined every case coming from
a federal court of appeals in which the OSG filed an amicus curiae
brief at the agenda stage between the 1970 and 1993 Terms.191 They
analyzed each Justice’s general ideological views as well as his or
her theoretically expected agenda vote in the case.192 They then
examined whether each Justice cast a vote consistent with the
186. See generally Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme
Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 505 (1998); Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court:
The Role of Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. POL. 187 (1995) [hereinafter
McGuire, Repeat Players]; Kevin T. McGuire, Lawyers and the U.S. Supreme Court: The
Washington Community and Legal Elites, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 365 (1993) [hereinafter McGuire,
The Washington Community].
187. McGuire, The Washington Community, supra note 186, at 386-87.
188. McGuire, Repeat Players, supra note 186, at 193-94.
189. See id. at 187-88.
190. See Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Solicitor General Influence and Agenda Setting
on the United States Supreme Court, 64 POL. RES. Q. 765 (2011).
191. Id. at 769.
192. Id.
2012] SUPREME COURT’S SHRINKING DOCKET 1259
recommended action of the OSG.193 The findings are remarkable.
Even those Justices most likely to disagree with the OSG—both in
a general ideological sense and in the particulars of the case before
them—still followed the OSG’s recommendation more than 35
percent of the time.194 Put in more personal terms, the results dem-
onstrated that Justice Thurgood Marshall, a staunch liberal,
followed a recommendation made by President Reagan’s Solicitor
General Rex Lee thirty-five times out of one hundred, even when
Marshall totally disagreed with the OSG recommendation in the
case. That Justices followed OSG recommendations to such a degree
even when they had so little agreement with the OSG provided, the
authors believed, strong evidence of OSG influence.195 
Additional work on the OSG suggests that the executive branch
might disproportionately benefit from a smaller docket. In a forth-
coming book by Black and Owens,196 the authors use cutting-edge
matching methods to find evidence of OSG influence. The authors
compare the success of OSG attorneys with the success of attorneys
who formerly worked in the OSG, and with the success of attorneys
who never worked in the OSG.197 They matched observations such
that OSG attorneys and non-OSG attorneys were as identical as
possible in terms of experience, resources, amicus assistance, and
other factors.198 The goal was to ensure that the two different groups
of attorneys were identical, save for the fact that in one set of cases,
the OSG argued before the Court, whereas in the other set of cases
a non-OSG attorney argued before the Court. 
The results are compelling. In terms of success before the Court,
an OSG attorney is 12 percent more likely to win than an otherwise
identical non-OSG attorney who formerly worked in the OSG, and
14 percent more likely to win than an otherwise identical non-OSG
attorney who never worked in the OSG.199 Moreover, the Court’s
193. Id.
194. Id. at 766.
195. Id.
196. See generally RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFLUENCE AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS
(Cambridge University Press) (forthcoming April 2012).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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majority opinions are significantly more likely to borrow language
from the OSG’s briefs than from otherwise identical non-OSG
attorney’s briefs.200 Finally, the Court is much more likely to posi-
tively or negatively interpret precedent when the OSG makes such
a recommendation versus an identical case in which it does not.201
In short, the OSG wields considerable influence across the Court’s
decision-making process. Such influence, we believe, will be mag-
nified exponentially with a depleted docket. 
D. A Smaller Docket May Diminish the Court’s Legitimacy
Finally, a depleted docket could lead the public to believe that the
Court does not work sufficiently hard or is not sufficiently fair, and
thereby diminish the Court’s legitimacy. The number and type of
cases the Court decides can shape the public’s perception of the
Court.202 As Justice Brennan put it: “The choice of issues for decision
largely determines the image that the American people have of their
Supreme Court.”203 When the Court fails to hear a case, it may
change how Americans view the judiciary. In other words, what
cases the Court decides to hear—and not hear—is important in
terms of perception and, ultimately, legitimacy. 
What is more, a smaller docket amplifies the effects of its
decisions. This is important because unpopular decisions by the
Court can “erode the institution’s political capital.”204 One may
question—as James Gibson, Gregory Caldeira, and Lestor Spence
have questioned205—the risk of such erosion considering the Court
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Brennan, supra note 164, at 483.
204. James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Measuring Attitudes
Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 357 (2003) (citing Anke
Grosskopf & Jeffrey Mondak, Do Attitudes Toward Specific Supreme Court Decisions Matter?:
The Impact of Webster and Texas v. Johnson on Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 51
POL. RES. Q. 633, 634 (1998)).
205. Id. at 359. Specifically, they questioned the purity of their dependent variable and
data. Id. at 357. They note that “[i]f the half-life of reactions to individual decisions is short
... then these reactions to an unpopular decision are of little consequence for institutions.” Id.
But if “the rate of decay is slow, then” the Court cannot issue too many within a short time
frame. Id. They found that, even when people keep an institutional tally of decisions, the
individual decisions themselves do not have much influence on loyalty toward the Court. Id.
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enjoys “widespread approval” and strong legitimacy among the
public.206 Although Gibson and his colleagues argue that individual
rulings are unlikely to deplete the Court’s “reservoir of good will,”207
they acknowledge that “sustained policy disagreement can under-
mine legitimacy.”208 That is, if the Court continually issues decisions
that conflict with Americans’ policy preferences, the Court’s legit-
imacy may falter. Thus, the number of cases the Court hears each
Term could influence Americans’ currently strong commitment to
the Supreme Court:209 as the number of cases decided shrinks, the
Court’s diachronic margin for error diminishes. If one holds the
number of “erroneous” decisions constant but allows the denomina-
tor—the size of the Court’s docket—to decrease, the relative effects
of the erroneous decisions become more pronounced. Because the
Court hears fewer cases, decisions that clash with public opinion
can harm the Court’s legitimacy to a greater degree than when it
hears a larger number of cases. In other words, to maintain legit-
imacy, the Court’s decisions must clash with the public view less
often than when it hears a greater number of cases.
Of course, even if one holds constant the percentage of “erro-
neous” decisions per term, a smaller docket could still be more
harmful to the Court’s legitimacy. This is because each decided case
has greater influence; thus, the percentage needed to maintain
legitimacy is now different from when it heard more cases. The
Court might have to render fewer erroneous decisions with a
smaller docket just to retain the same amount of legitimacy it
enjoyed with a larger docket. To be sure, these are empirical ques-
tions that deserve to be tested. Theoretically, however, the argu-
ments against a small docket make intuitive sense.
Legitimacy alone, however, may not tell the whole story. Tom
Tyler and Kenneth Rasinski argue that the Supreme Court’s per-
ceived legitimacy is linked to the perceived fairness of its internal
at 364.
206. Id. at 359.
207. Id. at 365.
208. Id.
209. As of 2003, the public seemed firmly committed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 358
(finding relatively high loyalty to the Supreme Court, in particular that “over four of five
Americans assert that it would not be better to do away with the Court, even if there were
fairly widespread displeasure with its decisions”).
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decision-making procedures, or its procedural justice.210 The authors
examined various survey responses to questions about Supreme
Court decisions.211 They tested the hypothesis that procedural
justice indirectly influences behavior—namely, whether people will
break the law.212 Although the authors found no significant rela-
tionship between procedural justice and acceptance of Court de-
cisions, they did find that procedural justice has “a very strong
influence” on perceived institutional legitimacy.213 Based on these
results, they contend that the Supreme Court’s legitimacy depends
indirectly on “the belief that it makes decisions in fair ways, not on
agreement with its decisions.”214
Because decisions influence whether the public perceives the
Court as legitimate, a smaller docket has the potential to catalyze
the erosion of the Court’s legitimacy. That is important because
people are more likely to follow a legitimate Court.215 We suggest
210. Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and
the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 621, 626 (1991); see also Vanessa A. Baird, Building Institutional Legitimacy: The
Role of Procedural Justice, 54 POL. RES. Q. 333, 351 (2001) (finding that in Germany a
legalistic model engendered the legitimacy of court decisions). But see James L. Gibson,
Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions:
A Question of Causality, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1991) (replying to Tyler and Rasinski);
James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and
Political Tolerance, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469, 483-86 (1989) [hereinafter Gibson,
Understandings of Justice] (finding that individuals’ perceptions of fairness within an
institution have no effect on their willingness to accept the decision as final and binding);
Jeffery J. Mondak, Institutional Legitimacy and Procedural Justice: Reexamining the Question
of Causality, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 599, 607 (1993) (finding no support for the idea that
perceptions of procedural fairness affect perceptions of institutional legitimacy). Using a
diagram, Mondak best summarizes the difference of opinion between Tyler and Rasinski on
the one hand, and Gibson on the other. Mondak, supra, at 600 fig.1. The difference between
them is the direction of the causal arrow: Gibson perceives legitimacy as influencing
perceptions of procedural fairness, whereas Tyler and Rasinski perceive perceptions of
procedural fairness as influencing legitimacy. Id.
211. Tyler & Rasinski, supra note 210, at 623-24.
212. Id. at 623.
213. Id. at 626.
214. Id. at 626-27.
215. Gibson, Understandings of Justice, supra note 210, at 489 (“Those who are supportive
of the Court are significantly more likely to comply with its decisions even when they are
disagreeable.”); see also Gibson, Caldeira & Spence, supra note 204, at 362 (noting that 77.7
percent of respondents with “‘hardly any confidence” still expressed willingness to “obey a
Court decision even when they disagreed with it”).
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that this consequence is another reason to be concerned about the
declining docket.
III. THEORIZING CHANGE IN THE COURT’S DOCKET SIZE
Until now, we have focused our attention on descriptive and
normative matters. We showed that over the last sixty-eight years
the Court’s plenary docket has decreased precipitously.216 We then
outlined the different theories offered by scholars to explain this
decline.217 Finally, we explored why the decline in the Court’s
plenary docket matters.218 In the next Parts, we move from descrip-
tion to explanation. Building on existing work, we offer and empir-
ically test our own theory for the change in the size of the Court’s
plenary docket—a theory rooted largely in literature on the ideo-
logical motivations of Supreme Court Justices and contextual
features that channel their behavior. 
We seek to discover why the Court’s docket has changed over
time. Our primary focus rests on the ideological composition of the
Justices serving on the Court. Our main hypothesis is that as
Justices become more polarized ideologically, they will decide fewer
cases, and, conversely, as they become more homogeneous, they will
decide more cases. We explain our rationale for this theory in Part
III.A below. At the same time, we believe—in line with existing
work219—that other contextual factors may be critically important
and simultaneously explain docket change over time. Chief among
these contextual factors are the Supreme Court Case Selections Act
of 1988, the creation of the cert pool, the Court’s relationship with
the circuit courts of appeals, and membership change on the Court.
A. Ideological Dispersion and Docket Size
In this Part, we explain our main theoretical assertion: ideological
dispersion influences the Court’s docket size. A host of recent
studies provide strong evidence that Justices’ decisions often turn
216. See supra Part I.B.
217. See supra Part I.C.
218. See supra Part II.
219. See supra Part I.C.
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on ideological considerations. Even at the initial stage of the Court’s
decision-making process, ideology matters. Justices’ agenda-setting
decisions are derived, in part, from their desire to improve the
status quo. Ryan Black and Ryan Owens found that Justices are 75
percent more likely to vote to grant review to petitions when they
expect that the policy arising from the Court’s merits decision will
improve on the status quo.220 In a similar vein, Gregory Caldeira,
John Wright, and Christopher Zorn found that Justices are more
likely to grant review of cases as those Justices become increasingly
similar ideologically to the mean of the Court.221 And Jan Palmer
discovered that Justices strategically set the Court’s agenda by
placing cases on the docket that they believe they will win, while
keeping off the docket those cases they are likely to lose.222 Other
studies reach similar results.223 Ideological considerations influence
Justices during oral arguments and the opinion-crafting process as
well. For example, Timothy Johnson, Paul Wahlbeck, and James
Spriggs show that ideology and an attorney’s quality of oral argu-
mentation conditionally influence whether a party wins before the
Court.224 A Justice’s decision to respond to a majority opinion draft
also stems from ideological motivations.225 Justices who agree ideo-
logically with opinion authors seek changes in their opinions only 15
percent of the time.226 Ideological opponents of that author, however,
seek changes to that same opinion nearly 57 percent of the time.227
220. Black & Owens, supra note 9, at 1066.
221. Caldeira, Wright & Zorn, supra note 9, at 563-64.
222. Jan Palmer, An Econometric Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions,
39 PUB. CHOICE 387, 396 (1982).
223. See, e.g., Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as
Strategic Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57
J. POL. 824, 35 (1995); Caldeira & Wright, Organized Interests, supra note 171, at 1109, 1122;
Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, The Discuss List: Agenda Building on the Supreme
Court, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807, 831 (1990); Kevin T. McGuire & Barbara Palmer, Issues,
Agendas, and Decision Making on the Supreme Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853, 863 (1996).
224. See Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs II, The Influence of
Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99, 111 (2006); see also
TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 18-19 (2004); Timothy R. Johnson, Information, Oral Arguments, and
Supreme Court Decision Making, 29 AM. POL. RES. 331, 346-47 (2001).
225. MALTZMAN, SPRIGGS & WAHLBECK, supra note 10, at 81-93.
226. Id. at 81-82.
227. Id. at 82.
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In a similar vein, there is a 900 percent change in probability that
a Justice will threaten an opinion author when she is an ideological
foe.228 The decision to join a final majority coalition reflects similar
ideological considerations.229
How might ideology influence the size of the Court’s docket?
Studies show that when groups contain individuals who think alike,
they are more likely to effectuate their goals and to do so with
dispatch. Groups containing members with diverse interests, on the
other hand, face challenges in achieving desired outcomes and often
observe fractured relations, lethargy, and stalemate.
In Hearing the Other Side, Diana Mutz examines whether expo-
sure to diverse views increases civic participation or leads to
depressed turnout.230 Mutz analyzes whether a fundamental tenet
of deliberative democracy—an informed and diverse electorate that
communicates with each other—actually leads to a more active
citizenry.231 She found that there is a tradeoff between participatory
and deliberative democracy.232 The more diverse views to which
citizens are exposed, the less active they are in political life.233
Exposure to a range of political and ideological views leads citizens
to shut down.234 On the other hand, exposure to information that
reaffirms existing beliefs leads to increased levels of participation.235
Other works similarly highlight the power of shared perspective.
Historian Lisa McGirr argues that similarity in world view, in
part, led conservatives in Orange County, California, to push the
Goldwater candidacy and redefine the conservative movement and
228. Id. at 87 (“[O]ur model predicts justices choose to make a suggestion or a threat in 1.7
percent and .8 percent of their first tactics when ideologically aligned with the author, and
these numbers rise to 6.6 percent and 8.0 percent when they are ideologically opposed to the
author.”).
229. For example, there is a 94 percent probability that a Justice will join a final coalition
when she is ideologically close to the majority opinion writer, whereas the probability drops
to 82 percent when the Justice is far away. Id. at 87-88.
230. See DIANA C. MUTZ, HEARING THE OTHER SIDE: DELIBERATIVE VERSUS PARTICIPATORY
DEMOCRACY (2006).
231. Id. at 1-17.
232. Id. at 110-16.
233. Id. (finding this result as to likelihood of voting, engaging in grassroots political
activity, deciding within a certain time period who should be President, and intending to
vote).
234. Id.
235. Id.
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its role in modern politics.236 In his work on the Paris Commune
Revolt of 1871, historian Roger Gould shows that only after workers
lived among one another in the same neighborhood did they coalesce
to form an uprising.237
Such findings apply to the elected branches as well. Take, for
example, the passage of significant legislation. Sarah Binder shows
that when Congress and the President hail from different parties,
the federal government suffers from gridlock and passes fewer
significant bills.238 Binder also demonstrates that as the parties
themselves become more polarized, Congress passes less significant
legislation.239 Other congressional scholars have likewise shown
than when party unity is high, rank-and-file members give party
leaders stronger powers to shepherd legislation.240
Court scholars observe similar features. For example, Nancy
Staudt, Barry Friedman, and Lee Epstein studied the role of ideo-
logical homogeneity vis-à-vis consequential Court decisions. They
examined whether, when Justices think alike, they are more likely
to work together toward shared goals.241 Staudt and her coauthors
show that ideological homogeneity on the Court leads to more
consequential decisions. The probability that a Court composed of
Justices with orthogonal world views would render a landmark
ruling was just 9 percent.242 When, however, the Court became ideo-
logically cohesive, the probability of rendering a significant ruling
increased to 33 percent.243
We follow the theoretical tack taken by Staudt and her col-
leagues. We theorize that a cohesive Court will decide more cases
than an ideologically fractured Court. Justices who share a world
236. See LISA MCGIRR, SUBURBAN WARRIORS: THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW AMERICAN RIGHT
12-14 (2001).
237. See ROGER GOULD, INSURGENT IDENTITIES: CLASS, COMMUNITY, AND PROTEST IN PARIS
FROM 1848 TO THE COMMUNE 27-29 (1995).
238. Sarah A. Binder, The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
519, 521-27 (1999).
239. Id.
240. See, e.g., John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, The Transition to Republican Rule in the
House: Implications for Theories of Congressional Politics, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 541, 545-47 (1998).
241. Nancy Staudt, Barry Friedman & Lee Epstein, On the Role of Ideological Homogeneity
in Generating Consequential Constitutional Decisions, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 361, 363-64
(2008).
242. Id. at 381.
243. Id. 
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view will decide numerous cases to further their preferences. On the
other hand, Justices sitting on a Court composed of a wide range of
ideological actors will be less sure of outcomes and will anticipate
more dissents and internal strife. As a result, such a Court will
decide fewer cases. Simply put, we hypothesize that as the Court
becomes ideologically dispersed, it will decide fewer cases.
B. Contextual Factors and Docket Size
Although ideology plays a large role in judicial decision making,
it is not the only factor that matters. Indeed, as we argued above,
scholars have hypothesized that a host of internal, external, and
hierarchical mechanisms may influence the choices Justices
make.244 Chief among these alternative factors are whether the
Term preceded the 1988 Act, whether the Court employed the cert
pool, the Court’s relationship with the circuit courts of appeals, and
Court membership.
1. The Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988
We start with the Supreme Court Case Selection Act of 1988.245
As stated above, when Congress debated whether to pass the Act, all
nine Justices on the Court authored a letter to Senator Kastenmeier
stating that mandatory jurisdiction took up too much of their
time.246 Congress heeded their calls; it eliminated essentially all of
the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction. After passing the 1988 Act, the
Court’s plenary docket began to decline.247 Some Justices attributed
this decline to the Act’s passage.248 With more discretion, the Court
freed itself from the weight of its caseload.249 Some scholars tested
this claim, but the studies do not appear to support the hypoth-
esis.250 Nevertheless, the temporal coincidence of the docket’s
244. See supra Part I.C.
245. Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257-58, 2104
(1994)).
246. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
247. See Hellman, supra note 66, at 403.
248. See id. at 409. 
249. Id. 
250. See, e.g., id. at 410-12.
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decline with the passage of the 1988 Act is too much to ignore. As
such, we hypothesize that passage of the 1988 Act led to a decrease
in the Court’s docket.
2. The Certiorari Pool
Many have argued that the cert pool led to a diminished docket,
as clerks have become hesitant to recommend a grant vote and risk
making the Court look foolish by accepting a case that is not truly
cert-worthy.251 That, at least, is the view of some Justices, law
clerks, and scholars.252 Interviews with both Justices and clerks
confirm that a culture of restraint permeates the pool.253 Clerks are
reluctant to recommend that Justices grant cert, and the Justices
understand why: in an environment in which all cases are treated
as fungible, recommending a denial of one more case is less risky
than recommending a grant.254 If one recommends denial, it is
harder to call it a “mistake,” because the issue will confront the
Court again. A grant recommendation forces the Court to confront
the issue now.255 As a result, the unwritten rule is to avoid what you
can. Accordingly, we hypothesize that after the adoption of the cert
pool, the Court’s docket decreased.
3. Ideological Agreement Between the Supreme Court and Lower
Courts
A further hypothesis, as we discussed above, suggests that the
Court heard fewer cases during the 1980s and 1990s because of its
ideological agreement with lower federal courts.256 That is, scholars
have argued that the Court heard fewer cases simply because it did
not need to audit the lower courts to the same degree as in previous
Terms.257 There is some anecdotal evidence to support this theory.
251. See supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
252. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 14, at 128-29, 143-44; Starr, supra note 6, at 1375-77. 
253. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 14, at 128-29, 143-44; see also Starr, supra note 6,
at 1375 n.66.
254. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 14, at 143-44. 
255. See PERRY, supra note 25, at 220-21.
256. See supra Part I.C.3.
257. See, e.g., George & Yoon, supra note 129, at 825-31; Lindquist, Haire & Songer, supra
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For example, of the 1385 cases the Supreme Court reviewed
between the 1993 and 2008 Terms,258 during which Terms the Court
was moderately conservative,259 roughly 21 percent came from the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,260 which is generally considered to
be the most liberal circuit in the country.261 The circuit scrutinized
next most often was the Sixth Circuit, whose cases constituted a
mere 7 percent of the Court’s docket.262 Indeed, decisions appealed
from all state supreme courts combined totaled just 13 percent of
the Court’s docket during the same time period.263 In short, it
appears that the Court had its sights set on reviewing the Ninth
Circuit. Accordingly, we hypothesize that as the ideological distance
between the Supreme Court and lower federal courts increased, the
Court heard more cases, and conversely, when the two were ideo-
logically in line, the Court heard fewer cases. 
4. Membership Change
Finally, we showed above that a host of scholars argue that the
Court’s depleted docket is a function of membership change.264
Standing above all others in terms of docket activity, however, was
Justice White. Justice White often dissented from the denial of cert
because he thought the Court had an obligation to grant review to
petitions showing the slightest of conflicts among the circuits.265 He
possessed an “unswerving view that the Court ought not let circuit
splits linger, that it should say what the federal law is sooner rather
than later.”266 Robert Stern and his colleagues show that Justice
White dissented from the denial of cert sixty-seven times during the
note 129, at 610-11. 
258. See UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DATABASE, supra note 26.
259. The 2008 Martin-Quinn dataset shows that the Court as a whole was moderately
conservative during this period. See infra Part IV.B for an explanation of Martin-Quinn scores
as a measure of ideological persuasion. 
260. See UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DATABASE, supra note 26.
261. See George & Yoon, supra note 129, at 829. 
262. See UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DATABASE, supra note 26.
263. Id. 
264. See supra Part I.C.1.
265. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1283, 1285
(2003).
266. Id. 
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1989 Term and more than ninety times in the 1991 Term, largely
based on his view that the Court had an obligation to resolve lower
court conflicts over the proper interpretation of federal law.267 Given
his well-known role in driving up the Court’s agenda, we account for
the presence of Justice White on the Court. Our expectation is that
the presence of Justice White increased the Court’s docket size.
    IV. ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL 
DISPERSION AND DOCKET SIZE
Our goal is to test whether ideological cohesion, along with other
features, influences the size of the Court’s docket. To examine this
argument, we rely on the United States Supreme Court Database
and the Vinson-Warren Court Database created by Harold J.
Spaeth.268 These databases contain information on the types and
number of cases heard by the Court, as well as important back-
ground and contextual components to each of those cases. Once we
collected our data, we were then in a position to determine our
dependent variable, measure our key covariate, and examine the
other features we believe may influence the Court’s docket size. 
A. The Dependent Variable: The Number of Decisions per Term
Our dependent variable, Decisions, is a count of the number of
cases decided per Term. We analyzed all orally argued cases decided
between the 1940 and 2008 Terms that resulted in a signed or per
curiam opinion, or a judgment of the Court. The mean number of
cases heard in a Term was 136.78. The minimum number of cases
heard was 71 (2007 Term), while the maximum was 215 (1940
Term). Table 1 provides a breakdown of all Terms and the number
of cases decided during each one.
267. See ROBERT L. STERN, EUGENE GRESSMAN, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO & KENNETH S.
GELLER, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 236-37 (7th ed. 1993).
268. See UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DATABASE, supra note 26; VINSON-WARREN
COURT DATABASE, supra note 26. We also relied on the Supreme Court Compendium to collect
portions of our data. See EPSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 26, at xiii-iv.
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Table 1: Number of Cases Decided per Term, 1940-2008 Terms
Term Cases Term Cases Term Cases Term Casss Term Cases Term Cases Term Cases
1940  215 1950  121 1960  143 1970  142 1980  150 1990  123 2000  87
1941  189 1951  107 1961  122 1971  164 1981  177 1991  123 2001  89
1942  210 1952  124 1962  145 1972  173 1982  189 1992  115 2002  83
1943  160 1953  114 1963  142 1973  169 1983  178 1993  99 2003  90
1944  206 1954  102 1964  120 1974  159 1984  162 1994  94 2004  88
1945  174 1955  120 1965  127 1975  176 1985  170 1995  89 2005  87
1946  191 1956  135 1966  146 1976  177 1986  172 1996  91 2006  79
1947  147 1957  152 1967  171 1977  160 1987  159 1997  94 2007  71
1948  155 1958  140 1968  129 1978  157 1988  165 1998  89 2008  85
1949  121 1959  129 1969  124 1979  156 1989  145 1999  81
B. Ideological Factors
To determine the degree of ideological cohesion on the Court, we
turned to an oft-used measurement strategy that examines Justices’
revealed preferences: Martin-Quinn estimates.269 The Martin-Quinn
estimation strategy employs a Bayesian modeling method that uses
Justices’ revealed behavior—that is, their votes—to estimate their
latent preferences.270 “Using data derived from votes cast by the
Justices and a Bayesian modeling strategy, [Martin and Quinn]
have generated term-by-term ideal point estimates for all the
Justices appointed since the 1937 term.”271 These estimates allow
scholars to quantify each Justice’s preferences during each Court
Term. Empirical legal scholars and political scientists alike have
employed the Martin-Quinn scores frequently as proxies for
Justices’ preferences.272
269. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 135 (2002).
270. Id.
271. Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, Ideological Drift
Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483,
1503 (2007).
272. See, e.g., Berry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.
J. 123, 134-36 (2003); Keith Krehbiel, Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median
Game, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 231, 236 (2007); Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The
Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of
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We examined the ideological cohesion of the Court each Term by
determining the Martin-Quinn score of each Justice, sorting them
from smallest to largest, and calculating the range among them.273
We calculated the absolute value of the distance between the most
liberal Justice and the most conservative Justice in each Term.274
For example, during the 1950 Term, the most liberal member of the
Court was Justice Hugo Black, with a Martin-Quinn score of -1.638.
The most conservative member of the Court was Justice Sherman
Minton, with a Martin-Quinn score of 1.323. The range between
these two Justices was 2.961. The mean range of ideology on the
Court during our sample was 6.642. The minimum was 2.801 and
the maximum was 11.122. We expect the coefficient on Range to be
negative and statistically significant, meaning that as the ideologi-
cal heterogeneity of the Court increases, the number of cases it
reviews will decrease. 
C. Contextual Factors
As we stated above, ideological cohesion is likely to play a role in
the Court’s docket size, but not the only role.275 There are other
factors which also may influence the Court’s docket that have
nothing to do with ideology. We argued that four alternative fea-
tures may influence docket size.276
One alternative factor is whether the Court controlled its own
docket. Our hypothesis was that the Court would hear fewer cases
after passage of the Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988.277
As such, we include a dummy variable for whether the Term post-
Conflict Cases, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 135, 147 (2006); Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn &
Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275,
1297 (2005); Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Chief Justice and the Institutional Judiciary: Strategy and
Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion Assignment, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1754 n.94 (2006);
Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The “Rehnquist” Court(?), LAW & CTS.,
Spring 2005, at 18, 18, http://www1.law.nyu.edu/lawcourts/pubs/newsletter/spring05.pdf.
273. Raw scores were collected from the 2008 Martin-Quinn dataset. See Measures,
MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, http://mqscores.wustl.edu/measures.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
274. If we refit our model using the standard deviation of ideology among the Justices
rather than the range, our results remain the same.
275. See supra Part III.B. 
276. See supra Part III.B.
277. See supra Part III.B.1.
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dated the Act. If the Term in question came after the Act, Judiciary
Act equals 1. If the Term under study preceded the Act, the variable
is coded as 0. Because Congress passed the Act in June of 1988,278
every Term after the 1987 Term is coded as 1 and every Term before
1988 is coded as 0. We expect the coefficient on Judiciary Act to be
negative and statistically significant.
Scholars also claim that the cert pool led to the Court’s decreased
docket.279 To account for this possibility, we examine whether the
Term came before the creation of the cert pool or after it. If the
Term preceded the pool, Cert Pool equals 1. If the Term came after
the pool’s adoption, we coded Cert Pool as 0. Because the Court
created the pool during the summer of 1972,280 we coded the 1972
Term and every one thereafter as a 1, and every Term before 1972
as 0.281 
As we discussed above, a third potential explanation for docket
size is the ideological agreement between the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts.282 To examine this hypothesis, we required
estimates of the ideological preferences of the Supreme Court—that
is, the median Justice on the Court—and lower federal court judges.
We retrieved them using the Judicial Common Space (JCS).283 The
JCS is a scaling procedure that allows scholars to compare directly
the ideal points of Supreme Court Justices, members of Congress,
presidents, and, most importantly for purposes of this Article, lower
federal court judges.284 The JCS relies on Keith Poole and Howard
Rosenthal’s Common Space data to estimate the ideal points of
members of Congress and the President.285 It uses the Martin-Quinn
278. See Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257-58, 2104 (1994)). 
279. See supra notes 38-55 and accompanying text.
280. See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 14, at 117. 
281. We also coded the number of Justices in the cert pool each Term. Our results did not
change.
282. See supra Part III.B.3. 
283. See Lee Epstein, Andrew Martin, Jeffery A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Judicial
Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303, 306 (2007) (pioneering the Judicial Common Space
measurement strategy). The author’s data are available online. See Lee Epstein, The Judicial
Common Space, UNIV. S. CAL., http://epstein.usc.edu/research/JCS.html (last visited Feb. 26,
2012).
284. Epstein, Martin, Segal & Westerland, supra note 283, at 306.
285. Id.; see also KEITH POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING 3 (1997).
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scores to estimate Supreme Court Justices’ preferences.286 To derive
estimates of lower court judges, it relies on the notion of senatorial
courtesy.287 That is, as Micheal Giles and his colleagues point out,
when senatorial courtesy applies to a judge’s appointment, that
judge’s ideal point can be coded as her home-state senators’ first
dimension Common Space scores.288 When senatorial courtesy does
not apply to a judge’s appointment, presidents are free to nominate
judges who reflect their own policy preferences, which means that
the ideal point of the judge can be coded as the President’s first
dimension Common Space score.289 The JCS uses this logic and
estimates the ideal points of lower court judges based on the
politicians who nominated them.290 The result is a score that can be
compared directly across institutions and over time.291 Empirical
legal scholars have employed these scores across the board.292 
We first determined the mean JCS score for each circuit court
during each Supreme Court Term. We then calculated the average
JCS score across all of the circuits in each Term, for a term-by-term
mean JCS score of the circuits. Next, we obtained the JCS-deter-
mined score for the median Justice on the Supreme Court during
each Term. After we identified the circuit average and the Court
median per Term, we calculated Distance From Average Circuit as
the absolute value of the distance between them. The distance
between the Court and the average circuit ranged from a minimum
286. More specifically, it transforms the Martin-Quinn estimates into Poole and
Rosenthal’s Common Space scale. See Epstein, Martin, Segal & Westerland, supra note 283,
at 306-07.
287. See id.
288. See Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges:
A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 631 (2001).
289. See id. For example, a judge appointed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals by a
Republican president is coded as having the same ideal point estimate of that president. If
that same judge had been nominated to a seat that observed two home-state Republican
senators, the judge’s ideal point would be coded as the average between the two home-state
senators.
290. See Epstein, Martin, Segal & Westerland, supra note 283, at 306-07. 
291. Id. at 306-09. 
292. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal
Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 395-96 (2010); Giles, Hettinger & Peppers,
supra note 288, at 630-31; Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States
Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1350
n.102 (2009).
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of 0.0006 during the 1999 Term to a maximum of 0.4567 in 1952.
We expect to see a positive coefficient on Distance From Average
Circuit, meaning that as the distance between the Court and the
average circuit increases, the number of cases the Court hears will
also increase.
Finally, we argued that membership changes likely influenced the
size of the Court’s docket.293 We discussed literature that suggests
that Justice White was responsible for an increase in the number of
cases decided.294 As such, we created a dummy variable for whether
Justice White sat on the Court. If Justice White was on the Court
during the Term in question—the 1962 to 1992 Terms295—Justice
White equals 1. If he was not on the Court, Justice White equals 0.296 
V. RESULTS
We theorized that five main factors are likely to influence the size
of the Court’s docket: the ideological dispersion among the Justices,
passage of the Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, the
creation of the cert pool, the median Justice’s ideological distance
from the average circuit court of appeals, and the presence of Justice
White.297 To test these claims, we employ multivariate analysis.
Because our dependent variable is a count—the number of cases
decided—we estimate a negative binomial regression model with
robust standard errors clustered on Court Term.298
293. See supra Part III.B.4.
294. See supra Part III.B.4.
295. See Ginsburg, supra note 265, at 1283.
296. Given our unit of analysis and limited number of observations, we could not control
for the entire panoply of membership change on the Court. Doing so would require a
completely different data set and analytical perspective. Nevertheless, if there is one thing
on which most scholars of the Court agree, it is that Justice White, above all other recent
Justices, sought to grant review to cases with alacrity. See supra notes 265-67 and
accompanying text.
297. See supra Part III.B.
298. When estimating models with dependant variables that count events, scholars
typically employ either the Poisson or negative binomial regression models. See, e.g., Stefany
Coxe, Stephen G. West & Leona S. Aiken, The Analysis of Count Data: A Gentle Introduction
to Poisson Regression and Its Alternatives, 91 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 121, 121 (2009).
Poisson is appropriate when the sample variance equals the sample mean. Id. at 122-23. If
there is overdispersion, the results from the Poisson model will produce downwardly biased
standard errors, resulting in an incorrect inference of statistical significance. J. SCOTT LONG
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Table 2 presents our results. The model performs well. It observes
a 61 percent reduction in error over guessing the mean value of
Decisions. The 2 is statistically significant, which means that we
may reject the null hypothesis that the independent variables
jointly have no effect.
Table 2: Negative Binomial Regression Model of the Number of
Cases Decided by the Court, 1940-2008 Terms
Covariate Coefficient Robust Std. Error
  Ideological Range -0.035* 0.011
  Judiciary Act -0.467* 0.064
  Cert Pool    0.060 0.058
  Distance from Average Circuit -0.748* 0.183
  Justice White  0.173* 0.058
  Constant   5.273* 0.091
     N=68. * denotes p < .05 (two-tailed test). 2=291.99*
More importantly, we find support for our main hypothesis. The
negative and statistically significant coefficient on Ideological Range
suggests that our intuition was correct. The Court decides more
cases when it is ideologically cohesive and fewer cases when it is
ideologically fractured.299 Because the substantive significance of
these results is difficult to determine from their coefficients alone,
however, we present substantive effects in Figure 5.300
The y-axis on Figure 5 shows the predicted number of cases the
Court will decide in a given Term. The x-axis provides three dif-
ferent values of ideological cohesion. The far left sector represents
the predicted number of cases decided by the Court when the
& JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING
STATA 372 (2d ed. 2006). The negative binomial regression model, on the other hand, includes
a parameter to compensate for overdispersion. Id. We observe evidence of overdispersion in
our data, so we employ negative binomial regression. We should also note that our results
remain the same if we employ asymptotic standard errors or nonclustered standard errors.
299. The variable remains statistically significant at the 95 percent level with a negative
binomial regression model, an OLS regression model, a Bayesian OLS model, and a Bayesian
negative binomial regression model.
300. See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew Schneider, On the Effective
Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1827-34
(2006).
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ideological range among the Justices is lowest—that is, it examines
a strongly unified Court. The middle sector reflects the predicted
number of cases the Court would decide when the ideological range
among the Justices is at its mean value. Finally, the sector on the
far right reflects the predicted number of cases decided by the Court
when the ideological range among the Justices is at its maximum
value—that is, when the Court is highly fractured.
Figure 5 shows that as the Court becomes ideologically dispersed,
it decides fewer cases. When Justices are ideologically alike, the
Court will decide 145-190 cases.301 When the ideological range of the
Justices is held to its mean value, the Court can be expected to
decide 128-164 cases. When, however, the Court becomes ideologi-
cally spread, it will decide only 102-147 cases.302 Despite the overlap
in confidence intervals, the predicted difference among all three
columns is statistically significant at the 95 percent level.
301. Predicted values were calculated while holding other continuous variables to mean
values and binary variables to modal values.
302. We should note that our results remain robust if we instead employ OLS regression
or Bayesian negative binomial regression.
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Figure 5: Predicted Number of Cases Heard by the Court"03
Minimum Ideological Range Average Ideological Range Maximum Ideological Range
Clearly, ideology appears to play a significant role on the Court's
docket size. Moving from the most unified to the least unified Court
leads to a 25 percent reduction in the number of cases decided in a
Term. Yet, ideology is not the only feature that influences the size
of the Court's docket. Table 2 shows that a host of other factors
matter as well, chief among which is passage of the 1988 Act. When
Congress passed the Act, it eliminated nearly all of the Court's
mandatory jurisdiction and allowed the Justices to decide only those
cases they elect to hear.304
As Figure 6 shows, the Justices took advantage of this congressio-
nal gift. Between the 1940 and 1988 Supreme Court Terms-that is,
prior to the Act-the model predicts that the Court decided roughly
303. The vertical line segments denote 95 percent confidence intervals around the point
estimate (the black dots). All other variables were held at their mean or modal values.
304. Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257-1258, 2104 (1994)).
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146 cases per Term.305 Yet, holding all else constant, after passage
of the Act the Court is predicted to decide only 91 cases per Term.306
The model predicts that the Court, on average, hears 54 fewer cases
per Term after passage of the Act than before it. The 95 percent
confidence interval on the predicted difference is 37-72 cases, which
means that the Court decided anywhere between 37 and 72 fewer
cases per Term after the 1988 Act. This difference is statistically
significant and dramatic. What is more, we observe these results
even after controlling for ideology, the cert pool, and other factors
thought to be associated with docket size.
305. The 95 percent confidence interval on this prediction is 128-164 cases.
306. The 95 percent confidence interval on this prediction is 79-92 cases.
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Figure 6: Predicted Number of Cases Decided by the Court Pre- and
Post-1988 Actao7
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Table 2 also shows a positive and statistically significant coef-
ficient on the variable for Justice White. We controlled for Justice
White's presence because scholars have attributed a large portion
of the Court's behavior to Justice White's desire to.clear up conflict
among the lower courts.308 Our findings support this hypothesis.
Figure 6 shows the predicted number of cases the Court would hear
and decide in the absence or presence of Justice White, holding all
other variables at their mean or modal values. Again, the y-axis
reflects the predicted number of cases the Court would decide in a
Term. The x-axis reflects whether Justice White is or is not on the
Court. When Justice White is not on the Court, the model predicts
the Court will decide 146 cases.09 When Justice White serves on the
307. The bars represent the average predicted number of cases heard, whereas the smaller
black lines show the 95 percent confidence levels around those predicted point estimates.
308. See supra notes 94-95, 155 and accompanying text.
309. The 95 percent confidence interval on this prediction is 128-164 cases.
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Court, however, the model predicts the Court will decide 174
cases.310 This difference of 28 cases is statistically and substantively
significant.a"
Figure 7: Predicted Number of Cases Decided by the Court with and
Without Justice White on the Court312
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310. The 95 percent confidence interval on this prediction is 163-185 cases.
311. The 95 percent confidence interval on the 28 case difference in predictions is 11-45
cases. This means that the presence of Justice White alone led to anywhere between an 11-
and 45-case addition to the Court's docket.
312. The bars represent the average predicted number of cases heard, whereas the smaller
black lines show the 95 percent confidence levels around those predicted point estimates.
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What about our other variables? We find no evidence to suggest
that, when accounting for each of the factors commonly associated
with docket size, the cert pool leads to a diminished docket. The
coefficient on Cert Pool in Table 2 failed to achieve statistical
significance, which precludes us from rejecting the null hypothesis
that it had no effect on docket size. As a robustness check, we
changed our measurement strategy and controlled for the number
of Justices participating in the cert pool each Term. Our results
remained unchanged. In short, although the cert pool clearly
changed some things about the Court’s internal processes, it does
not appear to have systematically reduced the number of cases the
Court decided per Term.
We stop to a take a moment to discuss our findings with regard
to the Court’s relationship with the lower federal courts. The data
suggest that when the distance between the Court median and
the average circuit court increases, the Court decides fewer cases.313
This finding defies our theory. Perhaps distance between the
Supreme Court and the median circuit court is not the best measure
for ideological alignment between the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts. A better measure might interact the distance be-
tween the lower court and Supreme Court with amount of hetero-
geneity among the circuits. Unfortunately, given the limited number
of observations, we cannot pursue such a strategy here.314 
We also checked the robustness of our findings by controlling for
the number of landmark bills passed by the previous Congress. We
believed that legislation might be relevant, especially in light of
recent comments by Justice Breyer that the health care bill is likely
to lead to a number of Supreme Court disputes.315 To determine
whether Congress recently passed significant legislation, we exam-
ined Stephen Stathis’s book, Landmark Legislation, which is a
313. See supra Table 2.
314. The findings regarding the lower federal courts also could be due to the JCS scores
being poor measures of lower court judge preferences. Recent empirical investigations reveal
that JCS scores have important limitations. See, e.g., Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens,
Estimating the Policy Preferences of United States Courts of Appeals Judges Across Circuits
and American Political Institutions 4-6 (July 10, 2009) (unpublished grant paper), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1435164.
315. See Tony Mauro, Thomas, Breyer Discuss High Court Docket, Clerks, Cameras, THE
BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Apr. 15, 2010, 1:43 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/04/
thomas-breyer-discuss-high-court-docket-clerks-cameras.html.
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compilation of the bills passed over time that are generally consid-
ered to be among the most important, policy-altering bills.316 We
coded the number of landmark bills enacted by Congress each term
and refit our model with both a lagged variable, counting the
number of landmark bills passed in the previous year, as well as the
number of landmark bills passed in the current Term. The coeffi-
cient on each of these variables is positive but not near conventional
levels of statistical significance.317 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
What do these results tell us about the future of the Court and its
docket? Plainly, they suggest that the Court will continue to decide
relatively few cases per Term unless the political landscape
changes. Until a President is able to make a series of unconstrained
nominations that make the Court more homogenous—or appoints
a series of Justices who, like Justice White, believe the Court has a
duty to clear up legal conflict—the Court will continue to decide a
small number of cases per Term. Of course, changing the law to
expand mandatory jurisdiction would also have an impact. 
Although unassuming, the small number of cases decided by the
Court—along with our ideology findings—presents several prob-
lems. By deciding a small number of cases, the Court risks missing
important issues in need of resolution. In deciding fewer cases, the
Court also risks losing touch with the culture and decisions of the
lower courts. When cases reach the Court, the Court confronts un-
certainty, including uncertainty concerning the accuracy or clarity
of information about the cases it chooses to hear. Because of this
information deficit, the Court may decide the wrong cases or decide
cases idiosyncratically. These possibilities increase with a smaller
docket. Given that an ideologically dispersed Court will decide fewer
cases, this risk grows when the Court appears least suited to deal
with it. Because more ideological dispersion correlates with fewer
316. STEPHEN W. STATHIS, LANDMARK LEGISLATION 1774-2002: MAJOR U.S. ACTS AND
TREATIES (2003). 
317. We do not include these variables in the model because Stathis does not code past the
Court’s 2001 Term. Id. at iv. Given our small sample size, we believed it would be better
simply to check the robustness of our results using these data, rather than putting them in
the full model, as the data omit six Court Terms.
1284 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1219
merits decisions, the Court is likely to perpetuate its idiosyncratic
decisions, and a small docket amplifies this problem. These idio-
syncrasies become more pronounced given the fractured nature of
the Court. 
Idiosyncrasies are not the only danger of a diminished docket; it
also can lead to the influence of certain parties or interests. Fewer
cases mean high-influence players—like the Supreme Court bar and
the Office of the Solicitor General—can capture the Court’s docket
more easily and influence a larger proportion of its decisions. 
The last problem with a smaller docket is the potential for it to
undermine the Court’s legitimacy. The visibility of individual
decisions increases as the Court decides fewer cases. If the Court’s
legitimacy depends on the public’s perceived fairness of its decision
making, or the decisions themselves, a smaller docket leaves the
Court with a smaller margin for error. Each individual decision has
a large amount of weight and, therefore, a greater potential for
undermining the Court’s legitimacy. Our findings on ideological
dispersion demonstrate this effect. The public may view a splintered
Court as less fair procedurally—as basing its decisions on political
views rather than on the law. Because an ideologically dispersed
Court is likely to decide fewer cases, it has a greater potential than
an ideologically homogenous Court to undermine its own legitimacy. 
* * * *
Ideology plays a role in the size of the Court’s docket. When
Justices share a world view, they decide more cases. When they sit
on an ideologically fractured Court, they decide fewer cases. These
findings accord with existing empirical legal scholarship which
highlights the importance of ideology and decision making on the
Court.318 
Do we believe that ideology alone accounts for the Court’s docket
shifts? Most certainly not. As our models suggest, the interaction of
all these variables combine to influence docket size.319 Indeed, post-
estimation analyses of the data suggest that some Terms influenced
318. See supra notes 220-29.
319. See supra Table 2. 
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the model more than others. Still, the data suggest that ideological
agreement among the Justices ought not to be overlooked by
scholars seeking to examine the conditions under which the Court
decides cases each Term. 
In the end, then, it would appear that unless something dramatic
in the political world changes, the legal world will continue to
observe low levels of Supreme Court activity, along with the detri-
mental factors that come with a fractured Court, such as increased
dissents, tolerated intercircuit conflict, and ambiguous law. 
When the next Supreme Court vacancy and nomination arises, we
are sure to witness another grueling examination of the nominee’s
ideology and background. To be sure, these issues are critical and
deserve searching scrutiny. Yet, we hope that policymakers do not
in the process continue to neglect the Court’s broader obligation to
clarify and unify law. We hope that when policymakers debate the
merits and demerits of the nominee, they press that person on his
or her views of the Court’s docket. Recent nominees, such as Chief
Justice Roberts, have paid lip service to the issue, but policymakers
can force the issue and persuade the Court to address head on its
obligation to provide clarity to the law. Failure by the Court to send
clearer signals could have damaging long-term consequences for the
Supreme Court as an institution.
